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Abstract
We provide novel evidence of discrete labor supply responses to tax incentives
and study the broader implications of discrete rather than continuous labor supply.
We utilize an income notch and a reform that shifted the location of the notch
in order to study the labor supply mechanisms. We find transparent evidence of
discrete labor supply responses, revealing that wage earners even in the part-time
labor market can face significant restrictions in their available labor supply choices.
As an implication of discrete labor supply, we show that the conventional differences-
in-differences and bunching elasticity estimates can be downward-biased when labor
supply is discrete.
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1 Introduction
Analyzing labor supply is one of the most important topics in labor economics, public
finance and macroeconomics. A central part of this work has been devoted to under-
standing how labor supply responds to various policies, for example how income taxation
affects labor supply decisions. Textbook models often assume that labor supply choices
are flexible and continuous because these models are designed to be simple, tractable and
easy to implement empirically, contrary to what discrete labor supply models would be.
However, many real-life labor supply responses tend to be discrete rather than contin-
uous, such as switching between jobs or choosing between part-time or full-time work.
Consequently, the choice between continuous and discrete models is a subject that has
been debated for quite some time in economics (see e.g. Dickens and Lundberg 1993 and
Blundell et al. 2008). Beyond theoretical and structural considerations, this choice may
have important consequences for quantitative analysis. However, the previous literature
has not extensively analyzed the consequences of continuous versus discrete labor supply
for the magnitude of the welfare losses or accuracy of reduced-form estimation methods.
This paper provides novel and transparent evidence of discrete labor supply responses
among wage earners, and shows that this feature has major implications for observed labor
supply responses to policy. We utilize a reform that shifted the location of an income
notch, allowing us to separate between continuous and discrete labor supply responses
to tax incentives. We then show with our simulation model that discrete labor supply
responses lead to a potential downward-bias in the reduced-form elasticity of taxable
income estimates, and also can reduce the true welfare impact of tax policies.
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we provide causal
and transparent reduced-form evidence of discrete labor supply responses. There is an
extensive literature on discrete labor supply, which is mostly theoretical or empirical
but structural, and thus quasi-experimental evidence on discrete labor supply is scarce
(Dickens and Lundberg, 1993; van Soest, 1995; Saez, 1999; Saez, 2002; Blundell et al.,
2008; Kreiner et al., 2015).
Second, we contribute to the literature analyzing optimization frictions. These are
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defined as factors of labor supply that are outside of the canonical continuous-choice
model, such as adjustment costs, optimization errors or inattention, and by definition in-
clude also discrete labor supply (Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem,
2013; Søgaard, 2019; Gelber et al., 2020). The previous literature finds that adjustment
costs attenuate labor supply responses and thus the observed elasticity of taxable income
(ETI). As an example, Chetty et al. (2011) find that search frictions reduce switching
from a current job to another, but otherwise labor supply is continuous in their analysis.
We show that continuous and discrete labor supply have crucially different welfare im-
plications: the observed ETI represents the sufficient statistic for welfare analysis under
discrete labor supply choices but not under temporary optimization frictions analyzed in
the earlier literature. Moreover, the discrete labor supply could be an important reason
for why the true elasticity of taxable income could be low, although not always.
Third, we contribute to the extensive literature estimating ETI with reduced-form
methods such as differences-in-differences (Gruber and Saez, 2002) or bunching (Saez,
2010; Kleven and Waseem, 2013) by showing that these methods can produce estimates
that are significantly downward-biased when labor supply responses are discrete instead of
continuous. As ETI is a key measure for welfare losses caused by income taxes (Chetty,
2009a; Saez et al., 2012), the downward bias would lead to an assessment that these
welfare losses are smaller than what they actually are.
Our empirical analysis in more detail utilizes a combination of an income notch, i.e.
a jump in the average tax rate creating strong local tax incentives, and a reform that
shifted out the location of the notch. The institutional setting involves a monthly study
subsidy for Finnish higher education students. A university student loses eligibility for
one month of the subsidy (approximately 500 euros) if her annual earnings exceed a
predetermined gross income threshold (9200 euros before 2008), causing a sharp drop in
disposable income. As Finnish university students typically participate in flexible part-
time labor markets during their studies, this notch creates a real constraint affecting the
labor supply choices for a majority of students. In 2008, the location of the threshold was
increased by 30%, allowing students to earn more income before they lose the subsidy
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they are eligible for.
We examine the impact of the reform on the whole income distribution. This allows
us to observe whether the notch also affected earnings further away from the threshold,
which is revealing for different labor supply mechanisms as argued below. To capture
the causal impact of the relocation of the notch, we develop a novel method in the spirit
of differences-in-differences method. We calculate the change in the relative density of
the students’ income distribution associated with the reform and contrast it to changes
in the distribution of a control group consisting of non-student young wage earners who
are similar to students in their labor market behavior and earnings. In this way we also
extend the standard bunching method to estimate the broader changes in the distribution
of the treatment and control groups. The changes in the density are measured using a
wide income range below the notch rather than a region just below it as in the bunching
method. Moreover, we measure the change in the density by the changes in the shape of
the distribution associated with the reform, while in the standard bunching method the
excess mass is calculated by relating the observed shape of distribution to a counterfactual
density estimated from the surrounding distribution.1
As our main empirical result we find that the change in the location of the notch
caused distinctive earnings responses from a broad income range for students, but we
find no discernible changes in the income distribution of the control group. Many stu-
dents who were located far below the old notch before the reform significantly increased
their earnings precisely at the time when the location of the threshold was increased.
Thus the overall shape of the earnings distribution changed due to the reform, evident in
that the density at lower incomes reduced, and consequently increased at higher income
levels. Because we do not find changes in the income distribution of the control group,
it is not credible that the earnings responses of students would have arisen from other
contemporary changes in the part-time labor market in Finland. Also, the income dis-
1Our approach is similar in nature to other methods used to analyze changes in distributions (see e.g.
Athey and Imbens 2006 and Firpo et al. 2009). However, by extending the methods used in the bunching
approach, we can more feasibly relate our estimates to those derived using the bunching method, which
has been predominantly used to analyze earnings responses to local discontinuities in incentives such as
tax rate kinks and notches (see Kleven 2016).
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tribution of students remained practically unchanged in the period before and after the
reform, which further supports the notion that the shifting of the distribution was caused
by the reform to study subsidy income thresholds.
In addition, extensive register-based panel data enable us to follow the same students
over time and link their earnings to the characteristics of the firm they worked for,
allowing us to shed more light on the mechanisms at play. The results utilizing the panel
dimension show that large and discrete earnings increases were much more common at the
time of the reform compared to the period before it. At the time of the reform, students
originally below the income threshold had about a 10% probability of increasing their
annual earnings by 50% or more, whereas in the years before the reform this probability
was constantly only 5%. This and other similar results further support the notion that the
earnings responses within a broad income range arise because of individual-level earnings
relocation responses and not, for example, by participation of more productive students
to the labor markets after the reform.
In order to understand the mechanisms explaining our empirical results, we contrast
the predictions from discrete and continuous labor supply models and show that our
results are only consistent with the discrete labor supply model. Our result, that a sub-
stantial fraction of students that who were initially located far below the notch in income
distribution responded to the shifting out of the notch, is not consistent with the contin-
uous labor supply model. In that model these individuals are unaffected by the reform,
because they have already optimized their earnings location and neither their abilities,
preferences nor budget sets change, when the notch shifts out. This argument applies
to all continuous models even when augmented with adjustment costs or optimization
errors. Instead, in the discrete labor supply model an individual considers multiple but
sparse earnings locations in the income distribution. An individual located below the
notch compares her utility in the chosen earnings location to the surrounding available
locations. If a location at a higher income level beyond the notch becomes more at-
tractive after the relocation of the notch, the individual responds to the reform with a
large increase in her earnings by switching to this new location. With heterogeneous
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individuals, a fraction increases their earnings leading to an overall shift in the earnings
distribution. This is exactly what we observe in our empirical analysis. Therefore, our
empirical results show that discreteness is an essential component of models analyzing
labor supply, as analyzed by a number of previous studies (Dickens and Lundberg, 1993;
van Soest, 1995; Saez, 1999; Saez, 2002; Kreiner et al., 2015).
We find further empirical support for the hypothesis that labor supply is discrete by
examining the responses of two specific subgroups of students: those who work in arguably
more discrete labor markets (public sector, or research, manufacturing and construction
in the private sector) and those working in less discrete labor markets (restaurants, bars
and cafes, hotels, cleaning and security services). The latter group faces less discrete
labor markets because they typically have more flexible working hours and are more
likely subject to hourly rather than monthly wages compared to the first group. We
find a significantly larger shift in the earnings distribution from below the original notch
for students who work in the more discrete labor markets. Furthermore, the distinctive
discrete labor supply responses among students provide evidence of mechanisms that are
likely to be applicable more broadly in the labor force, as typical labor markets feature
even more discreteness than those where students work.2
We apply a novel method we developed to estimate the earnings elasticity with respect
to taxes when labor supply is discrete that uses the relocation of the income notch as
exogenous variation. When labor supply is discrete, an appropriate elasticity concept is
mobility elasticity, which measures earnings responses across discrete earnings locations
as a response to a change in the average tax rates across these locations (Saez, 2002;
Kreiner et al., 2015). In contrast, when labor supply is continuous, we would apply the
standard ETI formula, where we apply a change in marginal tax rate only to those who
are affected by the change based on their pre-reform earnings location.
In our method to estimate the mobility elasticity, we relate changes in log earnings
across the whole income distribution due to the reform to the changes in the average
tax rates. The benefit of this approach is that it captures all the responses created by
2This argument about discreteness applies even though the underlying preferences determining re-
sponsiveness to incentives might be different among students compared to other wage earners.
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the reform and relates them to a theoretically meaningful change in tax incentives in the
discrete choice framework. We provide an estimate of 0.18 for the mobility elasticity,
which is close to earlier earnings elasticity estimates in the literature (see Saez et al.
(2012) for a survey) and also close to what Søgaard (2019) finds for university students
in Denmark who face a similar income threshold involving a kink instead of a notch.
However, if we had instead used the standard bunching method presented in Kleven and
Waseem (2013) to estimate the elasticity utilizing the local excess mass relative to the
surrounding stationary income distribution just below the notch, we would have estimated
a significantly smaller elasticity of 0.07. The bias in the bunching estimate arises from
the fact that this method cannot capture those responding to a local incentive beyond
its immediate surroundings, which we identify utilizing the threshold reform. In general,
our analysis illustrates that the definition of a treatment group and construction of a
counterfactual need to be reconsidered in the standard bunching method when earnings
responses are discrete.
Moreover, we build a simulation model calibrated to the observed responses of stu-
dents to illustrate the impact of discrete versus continuous labor supply on reduced-form
income elasticity estimates. To keep the analysis tractable, we simulate a simple tax re-
form where an increase in the marginal tax rate from 40% to 60% above a predetermined
kink point is repealed, representing a tax rate cut for higher incomes. We then apply the
standard ETI estimator based on a differences-in-differences method that, for example,
Gruber and Saez (2002) use in their seminal paper, as well as our mobility elasticity esti-
mator that produces unbiased estimates. We find that the standard elasticity estimator
could produce a significant downward bias depending on how taxpayers are assigned into
treatment and control groups. The bias occurs when those who do not face a tax rate
change based on their pre-reform earnings are assigned into the control group, but these
individuals could nevertheless respond to the reform when earnings choices are discrete.
In our baseline simulation, the mobility elasticity estimate is almost twice as large as the
biased ETI estimate (0.177 vs. 0.098). Another source of bias in the standard estimates
stems from the tax rates used in the estimator because they differ under the continuous
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and discrete labor supply models.
Furthermore, discreteness of labor supply affects the magnitude of the unbiased true
ETI. In our baseline simulation calibrated to match our empirical data, the true elasticity
is smaller in the discrete than in the continuous model by a factor of more than two.
Contrary to this, Kreiner et al. (2015) find that the elasticity might be larger in the long
run than in short run in their discrete job-search model, which resembles our discrete labor
supply model. The mechanism Kreiner et al. (2015) emphasize is that with a discrete
set of alternative choices individuals respond by making larger jumps in their earnings
when they switch between jobs compared to a continuous model. Our simulations are in
line with this but also show that a significant fraction of individuals do not respond to
changes in tax incentives at all because of a larger distance between available earnings
locations in the discrete model. Thus the average labor supply response could be either
larger or smaller under the discrete as compared to the continuous model depending on
which of the mechanisms dominate. In our simulation calibrated to match our empirical
data the latter effect dominates. More broadly, this finding suggests that discrete labor
supply provides a feasible explanation of why most previous studies tend to find small
or modest ETI estimates and also why the estimates differ under various institutional
contexts (see Saez et al. 2012 and Neisser 2019).
Finally, the tax elasticity under discrete labor supply relates to the discussion on
the welfare implications of taxes in the optimization frictions literature (Chetty, 2009a;
Chetty, 2012). In the static discrete labor supply model the observed mobility elasticity
estimate represents the sufficient statistic for welfare analysis. In contrast, in a model
where labor supply is constrained by temporary adjustment frictions, such as inattention,
low tax salience and optimization errors, the empirically observed elasticity is smaller than
the underlying structural elasticity, and is therefore not the sufficient statistic for welfare
analysis (Chetty et al., 2009; Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012; Chetty et al., 2013;
Chetty and Saez, 2013; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Søgaard, 2019; Gelber et al., 2020).
Therefore, the distinction between the mechanism analyzed in this paper and those in
earlier studies is that they entail different welfare implications. However, empirically
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both mechanisms may be important in explaining observed labor supply and earnings
responses to taxes.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant institutions and em-
pirical methods. Section 3 presents the empirical results. In Section 4 we discuss the
theoretical mechanisms, and Section 5 presents our simulation results and discusses the
broader implications of discrete labor supply. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutions, data and empirical methods
2.1 Study subsidy for university students
In Finland, all students who are enrolled in a university or polytechnic can apply for a
monthly-based study subsidy, administered nationally by the Social Insurance Institution
of Finland (hereafter SII). The subsidy is intended to enhance equal opportunities in
acquiring higher education, and to provide income support for students who often have
low disposable incomes. In Finland, university education is publicly provided and there
are no tuition fees. A large proportion of individuals receive higher education in Finland
(approximately 40% of individuals aged 25-34 have a degree), and the study subsidy
program is widely used among students.
The maximum amount of the subsidy was 461 euros per month in 2007. The default
number of subsidy months per year is 9, which a large proportion of students also choose.
The eligibility for the study subsidy depends on personal annual gross income (labor
income + capital income), and an academic criterion of completing a certain predefined
number of credit points per academic year. Parental income or wealth do not affect
eligibility nor the amount of the benefit for students not living with their parents.3
The discontinuity in labor supply incentives is created by an income threshold. If
a student has annual gross income higher than a predetermined threshold, the study
3The full study subsidy includes a study grant and a housing benefit. The standard study grant was
259€/month and the maximum housing benefit 202€/month in the academic year 2006/2007. Housing
benefits are granted only for rental apartments, and the housing allowance is reduced if spousal gross
income exceeded 15,200 per year (in 2007). In addition to the study subsidy, students can apply for
repayable student loans which are secured by central government.
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subsidy of one month is reclaimed by the SII. This results in an increase in the effective
average tax rate, or an increase in the implied marginal tax rate of over 100%, in a region
just above the threshold, creating a notch in the budget set of students. With the default
9 months of the subsidy that most students take, the income threshold was at 9260
euros in 2007. An additional month of the subsidy was reclaimed for an additional 1010
euros of income above the threshold. This implies that the schedule ultimately comprises
multiple notches. Students can deviate from the default of 9 months and alter the number
of subsidy months by application, or by returning already granted subsidies by the end of
March in the next calendar year. Having more study subsidy months reduces the income
threshold, and vice versa.4
The study subsidy program was reformed in 2008. In the reform the income thresh-
old was increased by approximately 30%. For a typical student with 9 study subsidy
months, the annual income threshold increased from 9260 to 12,070 euros. In addition,
the monthly study subsidy was increased slightly from 461 to 500 euros per month. Other
details of the system were not changed, including the academic criterion related to the
required number of academic credits.5
Figure 1 illustrates the study subsidy schedule before and after 2008 for a student who
collects the default 9 subsidy months. First, the figure shows that students face large local
incentives not to exceed the income threshold. Once the income threshold is exceeded,
losing one month of the subsidy causes a significant dip in disposable income. Therefore,
the notch created by the study subsidy induces a strictly dominated region just above
the threshold where students can earn more disposable income by reducing their gross
earnings. Furthermore, the figure underlines the distinctive change in incentives caused
by the increase in the location of the income threshold in 2008, highlighting that the
reform encouraged students to increasing their earnings above the old income threshold.
Finally, Table A1 in Appendix A shows the income thresholds in numbers before and
4In 2007, the formula for the annual income threshold was the following: 505 euros per study subsidy
month and 1515 euros per month without the study subsidy, plus a fixed amount of 170 euros.
5As with the old regime, an additional month of the subsidy is reclaimed after an additional 1310
euros of gross income above the threshold. After 2008, the formula for the threshold was the following:
660 euros per study subsidy month and 1970 euros per month when no study subsidies are collected,
plus a fixed amount of 220 euros.
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after 2008, and presents the relative loss in disposable income incurred if the income
threshold was exceeded.
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Although the majority of students have access to the study subsidy and repayable student
loans, most university students in Finland also work part-time during their studies within
and between semesters. Therefore, the means-testing of the study subsidy creates a
real constraint affecting the labor supply choices for a majority of students. In our
analysis, we use panel data on all working-age individuals (15–70 years) living in Finland
in 1999–2013, provided by Statistics Finland. These data include a variety of register-
based variables, such as detailed information on tax register and social benefit items,
including information on the study subsidy program. With these data, we can analyze
responses to the incentives created by the program and learn how various individual
characteristics affect labor supply responses.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for students in 1999–2013. In our analysis,
we drop first-year students and students who graduate within a given year in order to
avoid the effects of potential income shocks before studies and after graduation. How-
ever, dropping first-year students and graduates does not affect the main results in any
meaningful way. Mean annual labor income among our sample of students is 8446 eu-
ros. We observe that 80% of students earned more than 500 euros of labor income in a
year. In addition, only 55% of students received labor earnings from only one employer,
indicating that students tend to work in different types of jobs during the year. These
observations indicate that many students work in part-time or temporary jobs during
their studies and breaks between semesters in order to increase their disposable income
and/or to gain work experience while studying. In terms of sectors, 19% of students work
in manufacturing including construction, 16% in hospitality services such as hotels and
restaurants, 39% in administrative and support services or in the public sector, and 25%
in other sectors including those whose sector cannot be identified in the data. In terms
of study fields, 17% of students in our sample study arts and humanities, 19% business
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and social sciences, 34% technology or health and social services and 29% in other fields
including those whose field of study cannot be identified.
In our baseline analysis, we focus on students who received 9 months of study subsidy
before and after 2008. For this group, the income threshold increased from 9260 to
12,020 euros. The advantage we gain by fixing the number of subsidy months is that
we can isolate the effect of the change in the location of the threshold on the earnings
distribution for a large part of the student population. This restriction is, however, not
very selective as a large proportion of students receive 9 months of the study subsidy,
partly because it is the default choice and partly because it presumably creates a good
balance between subsidies and labor earnings for many students. The share of students
receiving the default subsidy months is 42.4%. Furthermore, students who receive the
default subsidy are very similar to the overall student population, except that they are on
average slightly younger (22.4) and have less labor income (5633 euros) than all students.
Nevertheless, we also test the robustness of our results by including students who deviate
from the default subsidy choice.
2.3 Estimation
The 2008 reform that shifted the location of the income threshold creates a unique em-
pirical set-up to study earnings responses to a distinctive and salient change in tax incen-
tives. We are particularly interested in investigating whether local tax incentives, such
as notches or kinks, affect income distributions further away from the local discontinuity
in incentives. Thus we examine the shape and location of the whole income distribution
before and after the reform, and develop a new method to estimate these changes building
on differences-in-differences and bunching methods. These allow us to observe whether
the notch also affects earnings further away from the threshold, revealing the existence of
potential constraints that limit the possibility to continuously adjust labor supply which
we discuss in detail below. Without the reform we could not identify those in the income
distribution who are affected by the notch but are located far away from it.
Labor supply responses to a local discontinuity in the budget set can be estimated
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with the increasingly popular bunching method (see Kleven (2016) for a survey). In the
bunching method, labor supply is captured through labor earnings z. Earnings respond
to an income notch at an earnings level z∗. The magnitude of the response is estimated
by relating the observed excess mass in the earnings distribution within an income range
[zL, z
∗] just below the notch to a counterfactual density that would exist in the absence of
the discontinuity. Typically, the counterfactual density is estimated by fitting a flexible
polynomial function to the observed earnings distribution, but excluding an income range
around the threshold. Graph (a) in Figure 2 illustrates a hypothetical distribution with
bunching below a tax notch. We present the standard bunching method in more detail
in Appendix B.
However, the bunching method produces downward-biased earnings response esti-
mates if the threshold affects the earnings distribution more broadly than just around
the local discontinuity. We explain in detail in Section 4 that discrete labor supply would
produce such wider responses. Then, the bias in the bunching method can arise from
two factors. First, local earnings responses just below the notch [zL, z∗] underestimate
the extent of the true responses. The responses from a wider income range could remain
undetected if they do not produce a clearly visible excess mass that is clearly distinguish-
able from the shape of the surrounding income distribution. Second, the surrounding
density outside the bunching region cannot be used to estimate a credible counterfactual
describing the shape of the distribution in the absence of a local discontinuity, because
the shape of the distribution is potentially affected by changes in the distribution from a
wider income range.
We take the idea of the bunching method but apply it to detect broader responses
in the earnings distribution we identify using the reform that shifts out the location
of the local discontinuity. Also, we follow a differences-in-differences (DiD) method to
estimate the counterfactual change in the distribution using the changes in the income
distribution of a control group, as detailed below. Graph (b) in Figure 2 illustrates these
broader changes in an earnings distribution that we aim to estimate. We exploit the 2008
reform and use the pre-2008 earnings distribution to identify the extent of the response.
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We set the lower limit zL well below the old threshold, reflecting the broader changes
in earnings in the distribution. We denote the distributions relative to the total number
of students in the distribution in order to take into account the fact that the number of
students at certain income levels might slightly differ between the years.6
More formally, we measure the change in the density as
bˆ(z) =
∑zH
i=zL
[
(cBj /N
B)− (cAj /NA)
]∑zH
i=zL
(cAj /N
A)/Nj
(1)
where cj is the count of individuals in an income bin j, and z denotes the income level
in bin j, and Nk denotes the overall number of students in the distribution. k = B,A,
where B denotes the time period before the reform and A after 2008. Thus
∑zH
i=zL
(ckj/N
k)
is the relative share of students in an income bin j within a fixed income range [zL, zH ].
Nj denotes the number of bins within [zL, zH ]. In the estimation, we set the lower limit
zL to zero and measure changes in the distribution below the old income threshold by
setting zH equal to the old income threshold (9260 euros).7
Furthermore, to estimate the causal impact of the reform on changes in the earnings
distribution, we utilize a control group in the spirit of DiD. In general, factors other than
the change in the location of the local discontinuity could inflict changes in labor supply
behavior and the shape of the earnings distribution of students, such as overall changes
in the economic environment and the local labor markets. We assume that changes in the
earnings distribution of the control group reflect the potential changes in the economic
environment similarly to the treatment group in the absence of the reform. Similarly
to the standard DiD estimator, our estimator does not require that the two groups have
income distributions that feature exactly the same shape or statistical properties. Instead,
the identification assumption is that the two distributions should develop similarly over
6In the standard bunching method, using relative distributions instead of frequency distributions
produces identical estimates of the relative excess bunching at a discontinuity, because in that method
too the outcome of interest is measured in relative terms.
7Our estimation approach is similar in nature to other methods used to analyze changes in distribu-
tions (see e.g. Athey and Imbens 2006 and Firpo et al. 2009). However, by extending the methods used
in the bunching approach, we can more feasibly relate our estimates to those derived using the bunching
method that has been predominantly used to analyze behavioral responses to income notches (see Kleven
2016).
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time in the absence of any changes in incentives.
In our empirical application we use young part-time workers who are not higher ed-
ucation students as the control group. The non-student workers included in the analysis
are not eligible for the study subsidy and thus not subject to the income threshold nor
the reform, but are of the same age as the students and work essentially in the same
local labor markets. Thus, the control group resembles the treated students as they have
similar average labor earnings as students and many of these workers have more than one
employer within a year. The characteristics of young, part-time workers are described in
Table 2.8
Importantly, because individuals in both groups work in the same labor markets, we
assume that any shocks affecting the labor markets would affect the earnings in both
groups similarly. If this assumption holds, the distributions of both groups would change
similarly over time in the absence of the reform, which is required for causal inference.
We evaluate this assumption by analyzing the development of the distributions before
and after the 2008 reform.
In the estimation, we follow the method described above to calculate the change in
the density between the two time periods, and subtract the change in the non-student
part-time workers’ earnings distribution from the change in the students’ distribution
bˆd(z) =
[∑zH
i=zL
[
(cBj /N
B)− (cAj /NA)
]∑zH
i=zL
(cAj /N
A)/Nj
]S
−
[∑zH
i=zL
[
(cBj /N
B)− (cAj /NA)
]∑zH
i=zL
(cAj /N
A)/Nj
]P
(2)
where superscript S denotes students and P non-student part-time workers. This estimate
thus summarizes the broader change in the earnings distribution of students caused by
the reform while taking into account any other potential changes in the labor market
environment of part-time workers.9
8The group of non-student part-time workers is selected to roughly match students’ job and age
characteristics. Students typically work in part-time jobs or full-time jobs for part of the year, i.e. they
work less than 12 months a year. In addition, students tend to be young. Thus the control group
comprises individuals who we observe to have less than 12 working months per year, and who are 19–24
years old. The age interval is chosen to match between the 25–75 percentile points of the students’ age
distribution. Our results are not sensitive to small changes in the composition of the non-student group.
9Following the bunching literature, the standard errors for bˆd(z) are calculated using a residual-based
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3 Main results
We begin by presenting the earnings distributions of students and the control group
over time around the reform in 2008. Figure 3 shows the labor earnings distributions of
students comprising the treatment group and non-student part-time workers comprising
the control group. The figure shows the distribution for those with positive earnings
within an income range of 0–18,000 euros in 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, denoting the pre-
and post-reform years, respectively.10
Remarkably, the figure shows that the earnings distribution of students has a clearly
different shape in 2008–2009 than before the reform; the earnings of students have in-
creased over a wide income range. Especially intriguing is that the increase also occurs far
below the old location of the income threshold where the income distribution shifted to
the right. Contrary to students, the earnings distribution of the control group remained
practically constant between 2006–2007 and 2008–2009. The earnings in the control
group originate from the same local labor markets as those of students in the treatment
group. This suggests that the shift of the earnings distribution cannot be explained by
other contemporary changes in the local labor markets affecting the earnings of both the
control and treatment groups.
To quantify the changes in the distribution due to the reform, we estimate the DiD
equation (2) that produces as its outcome the change in the relative density of students
subtracted by the change in the density of the control group. The estimation is performed
within an income range of 0–9260 euros, thus including the whole distribution below the
old income threshold. The estimate is large (9.809 with a standard error of 1.01 ), suggest-
ing that the magnitude of the change in the overall earnings distribution is economically
and statistically significant. This estimate is approximately three times larger than the
standard bunching estimate, 2.931 (0.875 ), estimated following the methods of Kleven
bootstrap procedure (see Kleven and Waseem 2013). First, we fit a flexible polynomial function to both
the pre- and post-reform relative earnings distributions of students and other young part-time workers.
We then generate a large number of new estimates for the distributions by randomly re-sampling the
residuals from these regressions (with replacement). The standard error is defined as the standard
deviation of bˆd(z) based on the bootstrapped distributions.
10The figure includes only labor earnings and not all income to which the income threshold applies
because receiving capital income is very rare among the students and other part-time workers.
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and Waseem (2013) within an income range just below the threshold (8100–9260 euros)
before the reform.11 In order to further characterize the general magnitude of the re-
sponse, we estimate that earnings increased on average by 550 euros when accounting
for the overall changes in the shape of the earnings distribution, which corresponds to a
roughly 10% average increase in labor earnings of students.
In order to be certain that the above estimates represent causal responses to the
reform, we need to assume that the distributions of the treatment and control groups
exhibit similar changes over time in the absence of the reform. As a first check to this
end, Figure 4 plots students’ and other young part-time workers’ earnings distributions
over a longer time period before and after 2008. The figure shows that the change in
the earnings distribution of students occurred exactly at the time of the relocation of
the income threshold, indicating that any gradual shifting of the distribution does not
explain the observed pattern. Furthermore, the distribution of the control group also
remained practically unchanged before and after 2008, therefore validating our empirical
setup. In more detail, there are similar minor changes at the bottom of the distributions
of both the treatment and control groups from 2004–2005 to 2006–2007, which further
strengthens the case that the distributions develop similarly over time in the absence of
the reform.
Our second robustness check concerns the characteristics of students in cross-sectional
distributions in different years. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows the distributions in
2006–2007 and 2008–2009 when we re-weight the student population in the latter period
to match the pre-reform characteristics of students in terms of age, field of study and
industry. This bin-level inverse probability weighting procedure accounts for potential
changes in key student characteristics over time. However, re-weighting does not change
the outcomes in a significant manner, indicating that potential changes in the character-
istics of the student population are not likely to explain the results.
Furthermore, one might be concerned that students can also respond by changing the
number of study subsidy months they choose. First, Figure A2 in Appendix A shows
11Bunching results are discussed in more detail in Appendix B.
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the distributions in 2006–2007 and 2008–2009 when including students with other than
the default 9 study subsidy months. The figure illustrates that the broader changes in
the distribution are clearly visible when including this wider group of students, implying
that labor supply responses rather than the choice of study subsidy months are driving
our main results. Second, we find no significant changes in the distribution of subsidy
months over time or associated with the reform, and 9 months is the most typical choice
in all of the years around the reform, as illustrated in Figure A3 in Appendix A. This
indicates that current students responded to the reform by changing their earnings, but
not, on average, by claiming more or less subsidies per year.
In addition, an examination of students’ earnings distribution in Figure 3 implies that
at least a fraction of students are aware of the exact location of the income thresholds
and are able to adjust their labor earnings in response to them, as bunching just below
the thresholds both before and after 2008 is significant and clearly visible. Furthermore,
the bunching response disappeared below the old threshold immediately after the reform.
Furthermore, even though the study subsidy schedule ultimately consists of multiple
notches, we observe a clear local response only to the first income threshold.12
Next, we present more detailed panel data evidence of the nature of the earnings
responses of students by estimating how individuals starting from different parts of the
base-year income distribution change their income on average. These results highlight
that many students responded to the relocation of the income threshold with a large
increase in their earnings. First, in graph (a) of Figure 5 we analyze average individual-
level earnings responses when starting from different income levels in the baseline year,
in 2005–2006, 2006–2007 and 2007–2008. Overall, the figure shows that average changes
in individual income are very similar in the years before the reform, and that there is
a visible pattern of mean reversion (on average, starting from a low income level leads
to larger income in the next year, and vice versa). The figure shows that labor income
12Additional examination of excess bunching before and after the reform reveals, as further illustrated
in Figure B2 in Appendix B, that relative bunching is slightly larger before the reform than after it. One
intuitive explanation for this finding is that the local incentives not to exceed the notch are somewhat
smaller after 2008, since the relative significance of losing one month’s subsidy in terms of disposable
income is now smaller than before 2008 when the threshold was at a lower income level (see Table A1 in
Appendix A).
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increased significantly in 2007–2008 compared to the years before the reform for students
originally below the threshold. This pattern is observable even for students with base-year
earnings around 3000–6000 euros, which is well below the old threshold. However, we
find no significant difference between the years for income bins above the new threshold,
suggesting that the rapid increase in earnings below the old threshold stems from the
change in the location of the income threshold.
Second, graph (b) of Figure 5 presents the likelihood of increasing individual earnings
by 50% or more relative to base-year income. We observe that large increases in earnings
are significantly more likely when the threshold was increased compared to previous years.
The prevalence of annual earnings increases larger than 50% doubled from 5% to 10% in
the income bins below the old income threshold at the time of the reform but remained
constant between the years before 2008. In contrast, there are no significant differences
in large earnings increases between the pre- and post-reform years in the bins above the
new income threshold.
Third, graph (c) of Figure 5 shows that the likelihood of locating above the old income
threshold in the next year increased significantly at the time of the reform, compared to
the years prior to 2008. The fact that the likelihood of being located above the old notch
increased even in the income bins far below the old threshold illustrates that a notable
share of students responded to the reform with a large increase in their earnings when
the budget constraint was relaxed at a higher earnings level.13
In summary, we find clear evidence that the 2008 reform shifting the income thresh-
old for students induced clear earnings responses for students throughout their earnings
distribution, and especially for those who were previously located well below the old in-
come threshold. This indicates that the relaxed budget constraint induced large jumps in
earnings for many students who were not directly targeted by the change based on their
pre-reform earnings. We explore the potential mechanisms explaining this result in the
13Furthermore, this panel data analysis shows that the observed changes in the cross sectional earnings
distributions of students discussed above stem from intensive-margin responses of students. To further
support this, we find that the share of students not working at all (earning less than 500 euros per year)
did not change significantly at the time of the reform. Therefore, potential extensive margin responses
do not explain the change in the shape of the observed earnings distributions.
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next section.
4 Conceptual framework and implied mechanisms
The aim of this section is to discuss which labor supply models are or are not compatible
with our empirical results presented above. The main feature we want to explain is the
shifting of the income distribution from a wide income range below the old threshold
following the change in the location of the income notch. We illustrate that a labor
supply model including a discrete component can explain these results while the standard
continuous models cannot. We also present the different elasticity concepts associated
with different modeling choices which we then use to estimate the earnings elasticity for
students, and discuss the welfare implications of discrete labor supply. In addition, we
utilize this conceptual framework in our simulation model, which we use to illustrate
and discuss the broader implications of discrete labor supply when estimating earnings
elasticities in Section 5.
Our starting point is that most of the existing literature on labor supply and earnings
responses to taxes, particularly the empirical literature studying the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI), assumes a standard continuous choice model either explicitly or implicitly
(Feldstein, 1999; Saez et al., 2012; Kreiner et al., 2015). Therefore, the continuous model
constitutes a canonical framework used to analyze and measure labor supply responses to
taxes and the earnings elasticity with respect to tax incentives. A popular extension to
this canonical framework is to augment the continuous model with various optimization
frictions that attenuate responses to tax incentives (Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012;
Chetty et al., 2013; Chetty and Saez, 2013; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). The motivations
for these adjustment frictions considered in the literature include job switching costs,
salience of tax rules or unawareness of tax incentives, all leading to either smaller or
delayed responses to tax changes.
A more fundamental deviation from the standard framework is the question of whether
individual labor supply choices are discrete rather than continuous. The idea of discrete
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and inflexible labor markets is not new in the economics literature, as they have been
previously analyzed and discussed in, for example, theoretical and structural labor sup-
ply literatures. For example, Lundberg and Dickens (1993) continue an older debate in
economics as to whether labor supply is continuous or discrete, and provide a theoretical
framework and estimations using a finite choice set for available working hours. Saez
(1999) argues in one of his extensions to the standard model that workers with specific
education, training and occupational skills rarely face a large set of available jobs that
match their skills and preferences, thus limiting their potential to flexibly adjust their
labor supply and earnings to changes in tax rates by changing their job. Kreiner et al.
(2015) build and estimate a structural search model with discrete choices, motivated with
similar arguments as Saez (1999). Other structural labor supply models often assume that
labor supply choices (working hours) are discrete in nature, stemming from the observa-
tion that working hours often tend to cluster at certain focal points in the distribution
(see van Soest 1995 and Beffy et al. 2018, and Löffler et al. 2018 for a recent review).
Manning (2003) discusses the role of the labor market power of employers in limiting the
labor supply responses and working hours choices of employees. Finally, Blundell et al.
(2008) estimate the intensive margin labor supply responses of single mothers to changes
in various in-work benefit programs in the UK. They find that the responses are governed
by discrete working hours responses between jobs rather than continuous labor supply or
wage rate adjustments.
Furthermore, various institutional features provide practical reasons for why annual
labor supply and earnings choices could be discrete at the individual level, and that these
discrete components can be rather persistent compared to more temporary adjustment
frictions such as unawareness of tax incentives or job switching costs. Wage earnings
can be decomposed into hourly or monthly wages and the time spent working. Both of
these elements, wage rates and working time, typically include discrete or discontinuous
components. First, in many types of labor markets, wage rates and working hours are
regulated either by legislation or by collective agreements. These include, for example,
minimum wage and minimum weekly working hours regulations. Second, discreteness
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arises from employment contracts between workers and firms. Such contracts are often
mandated in labor legislation, but even in the absence of that both employees and em-
ployers can benefit from forming a contract. For a worker, fixed-term contracts ensure
a predictable level of future earnings, and for the employer they guarantee a sufficient
labor force for a given time period. These employment contracts typically set either the
wage rate or working hours or both for a fixed period of time and also include a fixed
notice period, inducing discreteness in the available labor supply and earnings choices of
an individual.
4.1 Labor supply models
Next, we present and discuss the different labor supply models in more detail. We start
with a canonical continuous model and then extend that with adjustment frictions and
discrete choice sets. A continuous-choice framework features a utility function over con-
sumption and leisure and a linearized budget set consisting of earnings, consumption and
income taxes. The utility function is u(c, z), where c denotes consumption (net earnings)
and z gross earnings, and uc>0 and uz<0. We abstract from income effects following the
earlier literature, and including them would not change the main results in qualitative
terms but would complicate the formulas. The budget set is described as c = (1−τ)z+R,
where (1− τ) is the net-of-tax rate and R is virtual income.
In our analysis, we follow the earlier literature and for simplicity parameterize the
utility function to a quasi-linear form as follows:
u(c, z) = c− w
i
1 + 1
e
( z
wi
)1+ 1
e
, (3)
where wi is an ability (productivity) parameter of individual i over which individuals
are heterogeneous. Thus, the utility maximization with respect to z gives the optimal
choice for an individual, z∗ = wi (1− τ)e, where e is the earnings elasticity parameter
with respect to τ , capturing the earnings responses to taxes. Thus the earnings choices
are determined in this parameterized model by the response to marginal tax rates given
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the innate productivity wi and e parameter. More generally, earnings elasticity in the
continuous-choice model can be expressed as
e =
dz
d(1− τ)
1− τ
z
. (4)
Next, suppose that there is an increase in the tax rate above a certain income thresh-
old. In the continuous model, if we start from an individual’s optimal income choice z∗
and do not change the tax system applied to this location, individuals will not respond
by changing their labor supply. Therefore, if tax rates are changed at a higher earnings
level, this model cannot capture any responses occurring to individuals below the point of
the (marginal) tax rate change. Hence, the continuous model cannot capture or explain
earnings responses from below the income threshold in our empirical case. Finally, panel
(a) of Figure A4 in Appendix A illustrates the indifference curves and budget sets when
there is an increase in the location of an income notch in the continuous model.
Adjustment frictions or adjustment costs can be included in the parameterized con-
tinuous model by adding to the utility function a friction parameter a ∈ (0, 1). If a is
close to one, responses to taxes would be minimal, and if a is close to zero, responses to
taxes would occur according to the standard model. The utility function then becomes
as follows
u(c, z) = c− w
i
1 + 1
e(1−a)
( z
wi
)1+ 1
e(1−a) (5)
From the above equation it becomes clear that considering these types of optimization
frictions merely reduces the responsiveness to taxes, but they do not alter individual
responses to taxes in a more fundamental manner. Therefore, this model does not produce
earnings responses from below the earnings level where the tax rate is changed.14
We can further alter the canonical framework by adding optimization errors to the
model, arising from an unanticipated shock to the initially chosen income. A simple
14Heterogeneous adjustment costs do not change this intuition, but could explain why some taxpayers
respond to taxes while others do not.
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approach to including optimization errors is to consider an error parameter drawn from
some distribution, r ∈ f(r). First, a taxpayer makes an optimal earnings choice z∗,
and then the optimization error alters this choice by r, such that the final outcome is
z∗ − r. A crucial aspect of optimization errors is that they are unanticipated and thus
do not enter the model when the optimal earnings choice is made.15 Therefore, these
kinds of frictions would typically cause only small deviations in income and lead to, for
example, some individuals being located in the dominated range above an income notch.
However, optimization errors do not, by definition, induce large responses to changes in
tax incentives, and therefore cannot explain income responses over a broad income range
below a notch.
Following Saez (2002), we model discrete labor supply through a constraint stating
that an individual chooses her earnings level from a set of discrete earnings locations.
Thus the choices are discrete even conditional on participating in the labor market. More
formally, individuals choose from a discrete set of alternative earnings location choices j =
1, ..., N , yielding utility u(cj−1, zj−1), u(cj, zj), u(cj+1, zj+1), but individual preferences
and the underlying ability distribution are similar as before. Thus, the utility function is
the same as above but indexes the discrete choices with j, denoting the available earnings
choices for an individual. The budget set is now described as cj = wj − Tj +R, where Tj
is the average tax at location j. The discrete choice the individual chooses is determined
by which location yields the highest utility:
u(cj−1, zj−1) ≤ u(cj, zj) = cj − w
i
1 + 1
e
( zj
wi
)1+ 1
e (6)
The main conceptual difference between this model and the continuous model is that
individuals now consider their utility in all potential states, zj−1, zj, zj+1. Intuitively,
if the tax rate changes at either zj−1 or zj, this can affect the location choices of an
individual even when the change in the tax rate occurs further away from the current
location in the earnings distribution. Therefore, a model including a discrete choice
15If individuals have an expectation of the shock or are risk-averse, they could respond to the expec-
tation but not to the realized shock.
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component can rationalize much larger jumps in earnings as a response to a local tax
rate change compared to any of the continuous models considered above. Consequently,
it also rationalizes earnings responses over a wide income range below the notch in our
empirical example. Figure A4 in Appendix A further illustrates the intuition of how the
discrete model can lead to a large jump from far below the original location of the notch
when the location of a notch is increased, whereas the continuous model cannot.
Finally, when labor supply choices are discrete, the elasticity concept derived from the
canonical continuous-choice model is not the correct one. Instead, the correct concept
is mobility elasticity (Saez, 2002; Kreiner et al., 2015). Mobility elasticity measures the
earnings responses when individuals move from one discrete earnings location to another
as a response to a change in the average tax rate across these distinct locations. Following
Kreiner et al. (2015) and Saez (2002), we can express mobility elasticity with the following
equation:
ζ =
dY
d(1−m)
1−m
Y
(7)
, where m is the average tax rate difference between two different earnings locations j
and j − 1, m = Tj−Tj−1
wj−wj−1 , and Y =
∑N
j=1(zjgj) where zj is earnings and gj the relative
mass of individuals in each earnings location.
Equation (7) thus captures the change in earnings inflicted by individuals moving
between different earnings locations due to changes in the average tax rate differential
between these locations. This elasticity formula captures two important features that
are missing from the continuous-choice specification when considering discrete responses.
First, mobility elasticity captures earnings responses over a broader income range across
multiple earnings locations, denoted above by dY . Second, the standard measure for the
change in the marginal tax rate does not necessarily capture the actual change in tax
incentives across distinct earnings locations, whereas the termm in the mobility elasticity
formula does.
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4.2 Earnings elasticity estimates and welfare implications
We apply the mobility elasticity formula presented above in equation (7) to approximate
the earnings elasticity of students. We utilize the relocation of the income threshold and
examine changes this caused in the income distribution. To obtain an empirical estimate,
we simplify the model by assuming that students choose from two earnings locations: one
below the old income threshold and one above it. First, we define the average earnings
locations of students below and above the old income threshold in order to calculate the
change in net incomes between these locations due to the reform. This constitutes a
theoretically meaningful measure for the change in tax incentives in the discrete choice
model. Average gross earnings were 6008 euros below the old threshold in 2007 in the
income range of 2000–9200 euros, and 11,821 euros above the old threshold in 2008 in the
income range of 9201–18,000 euros.16 Then we use the tax and subsidy rules before and
after the 2008 reform to derive the net incomes at these locations. Due to the shifting of
the notch, the net earnings difference between these two locations increased mechanically
from 3534 to 4807 euros.
Next we define the change in earnings caused by individuals moving between the
earnings locations in the discrete model. Average earnings were 7116 euros and 7529
euros in 2007 and 2008, and thus the average real earnings within an income range
range of 2000–18,000 euros increased by 413 euros from 2017 to 2018.17 To calculate the
mobility elasticity, we relate the average change in log gross earnings to the log change in
the difference in net incomes between the average earnings locations below and above the
threshold. This delivers a mobility elasticity estimate of 0.183.18 Therefore, even though
the reform caused large and distinctive earnings responses over a wide income range, the
strong incentive change caused by the reform implies that the earnings elasticity estimate
is nevertheless modest. Our estimate is also close to earlier earnings elasticity estimates
in the literature (see Saez et al. (2012) for a survey) and also close to what Søgaard (2019)
16We limit our analysis to the income range of 2000-18,000 euros as there were no changes in the
distribution in the area below 2000 or above 18,000 euros between 2007–2008 (see Figure 3).
17As illustrated in Figure 4, there were no significant changes in the annual earnings of students in
years absent the 2008 reform.
18Table A2 in Appendix A presents the variables used to calculate the mobility elasticity estimate.
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finds for university students in Denmark who face a similar income threshold involving a
kink instead of a notch.
How does our simplified characterization of the mobility elasticity compare to an es-
timate derived using a continuous choice framework? Using the reduced-form earnings
elasticity formula for income notches presented in Kleven and Waseem (2013), we obtain
a local elasticity estimate of 0.065 (0.007 ) for students with 9 subsidy months when utiliz-
ing bunching responses to the income threshold (see Appendix B for more details on the
estimation procedure). Therefore, in this case, the continuous-choice model delivers an
earnings elasticity estimate that is approximately 2.5 times smaller than in the discrete
choice framework.19 This difference stems from the fact that the bunching method un-
derestimates the extent of the overall behavioral response to the notch. As the relocation
choices of students occurred from far below the old threshold, the bunching responses
estimated using the stationary distribution just below the notch have a limited potential
to capture all relevant earnings responses to the income threshold.
More broadly, discrete labor supply could provide an explanation for why we tend not
to observe bunching at tax rate kinks but do tend to find significant earnings elasticity
estimates from the same countries and contexts when using methods that capture earnings
responses from a wider income range. For example, in the US, bunching responses at
income tax rate kinks for other individuals than the self-employed are very small or zero
(Saez 2010), but the DiD estimates for ETI are typically significantly larger even for
regular wage earners (see Saez et al. 2012 and Weber 2011). Similar evidence is also
available for Sweden (see Bastani and Selin 2014 and Blomquist and Selin 2010) and
Denmark (see Kleven and Schultz 2014 and Chetty et al. 2011). We discuss the more
general implications of discrete vs. continuous models for earnings elasticity estimates in
Section 5.20
19An alternative approach to measure the difference between the approaches is to relate the broader
changes in the distribution to the local estimate derived from the continuous model. In Figure 3, we find
that the broader relative changes in the earnings distribution are approximately three times larger than
the bunching estimate just below the threshold (9.81 vs. 2.93). Overall, these findings imply that when
earnings choices are discrete, the bunching method can significantly underestimate the true earnings
responses.
20Even though the bunching method has clear limitations when earnings choices are discrete, it can
be a useful method in other contexts. For example, bunching estimates can deliver relevant evidence of
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Furthermore, earnings elasticity estimates are tightly linked to welfare analysis of
income taxes and income transfers. A key method for analyzing the welfare losses of
income taxes and transfers is the sufficient statistic approach (see e.g. Chetty 2009a),
where the idea is to estimate a single reduced-form parameter to measure the welfare
loss. Following Chetty (2009b) and Slemrod (1998), the welfare (W ) effect of a tax rate
change can be formalized as follows
dW
dτ
=
dR
dτ
− ∂R
∂τ
|M (8)
where dR/dτ denotes how total tax revenue (aggregate earnings over all individuals times
the tax rate) responds to a change in the tax rate, and ∂R/∂τ |M denotes the mechanical
change in revenue absent any behavioral responses. The welfare loss stems from the
extent to which (taxable) earnings respond to a change in the tax rate. As discussed
in Chetty (2009a), the underlying earnings response mechanism does not change the
basic idea of the sufficient statistic approach. For example, assuming discrete rather than
continuous labor supply choices does not change the sufficient statistic formula. However,
as discussed above, the correct elasticity concept can depend on the chosen model, and
that affects the estimation method and could significantly impact the size of the estimated
elasticity used to measure the welfare loss.
The fundamental aim of the welfare analysis is to estimate a structural long-run elas-
ticity unaffected by any short-run frictions (Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2013).
The estimated earnings elasticity under temporary adjustment frictions, such as inat-
tention to taxes or optimization errors, tends to be lower than the structural long-run
elasticity (Chetty, 2012). In contrast, discrete labor supply is not a temporary friction,
but rather discreteness is a permanent constraint for labor supply. Therefore, the ob-
served elasticity in a pure discrete labor supply model is also the structural elasticity.
Thus, different optimization frictions have very different welfare implications. Also, the
observed elasticities constrained only by discreteness in labor supply are the sufficient
behavioral responses among business owners and the self-employed or when detecting tax avoidance and
evasion responses. In these instances, discrete choices are not a likely constraint for earnings responses.
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statistics for welfare losses. Empirically observed behavior is likely to be constrained by
both adjustment costs and discreteness, and thus both arguments may hold at the same
time.
Finally, as argued in Chetty (2012), earnings responses to very distinctive changes
in incentives can produce an elasticity estimate that is less affected by any short-run
frictions, such as inattention. However, under discrete labor supply the argument changes,
and then what matters more is whether a large fraction of individuals can meaningfully
change earnings location as a response to a tax change, and the short- vs long-run is
not as essential argument. Relatedly, Kleven and Waseem (2013) argue that utilizing
the share of individuals located in the region of dominated choice just above an income
notch can deliver relevant information on the extent of short-run frictions affecting the
earnings adjustments to taxes. However, the dominated range is not necessarily a sub-
optimal choice for an individual who faces a discrete choice constraint, as an available
earnings location might be optimal even when it is directly above a notch, if other choices
are sufficiently far away from it. Therefore, when labor supply is discrete, following
the approach in Kleven and Waseem (2013) and relating the share of individuals in
the dominated range to the estimated local counterfactual does not deliver a consistent
measure of to what extent optimization frictions affect responses to taxes.
4.3 Further empirical evidence of discrete earnings responses
Above we provided theoretical reasoning for how discrete choice elements explain our
empirical results. Next, we provide further empirical evidence of the role of discrete
labor supply. We examine the responses of two specific subgroups of students working in
labor markets featuring more or less discreteness: those who work in the public sector,
or research, manufacturing and construction in the private sector, and those working
in restaurants, bars and cafes, hotels and other accommodation services, cleaning and
security services, and retail sales such as supermarkets and gas stations. The latter
group typically have more flexible working hours and are more likely to be subject to
hourly rather than monthly wages, compared to the first group. Therefore, students in
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the latter group are more likely to have less discrete labor supply compared to the first
group.
Figure 6 shows that the changes in the earnings distribution over a broader income
range after the 2008 reform are smaller for those students who work in less discrete labor
markets (6.14 (1.71 )), and larger for those working in jobs with less available discrete
choices (10.94 (1.10 )). This difference in the amount of shifting in the distributions sup-
ports our hypothesis that discrete responses are a key factor explaining the main result of
widespread income responses from far below the notch. However, we also detect statisti-
cally significant responses over a wide income range for those in the first group, illustrating
that discrete labor supply can induce a relevant constraint even in more flexible labor
markets, consistent with our notion that discrete labor supply is a feasible framework to
consider for all wage earners. Also, these findings suggest that the discreteness can differ
significantly between different types of labor markets, which can lead to differences in the
estimates of observed behavioral responses to tax incentives. We further discuss this in
Section 5.3.
5 Broader empirical implications of discrete labor sup-
ply
In this section, we further analyze the labor supply mechanisms and demonstrate the wel-
fare implications of discreteness in labor supply. First, we present the simulation model
we use in this analysis. Then we provide simulation results that illustrate the mech-
anisms behind the income responses of students under different modeling assumptions,
highlighting that a discrete model as opposed to a continuous model qualitatively matches
our empirical findings. The analysis proceeds by presenting how standard reduced-form
tax elasticity estimates based on a continuous model can be biased when labor supply is
discrete rather than continuous.
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5.1 Simulation model
We build our simulation model on the theoretical framework presented in Section 4. The
individual utility function is given in equation (3), where the e parameter governs the
disutility from earnings supply and would correspond to the elasticity with respect to
taxes in the continuous model. The discrete model has the same utility function but
adds a fixed number of discrete earnings choices to the individual decision problem as an
additional constraint. The budget set for individuals arises from the tax system included
in the simulations which we discuss below.
The model assumes an underlying ability distribution from which each individual i re-
ceives a predetermined draw wi. This draw represents earnings in the absence of responses
to the tax system. Our parameterized ability distribution is presented in Figure A5 in
Appendix A.21 The available discrete earnings locations for each individual are drawn
from the probability distribution presented in Figure A6 in Appendix A. The number
of choices drawn can be altered in different specifications and the draws vary between
different individuals. Therefore, even when the individual-level choices are discrete, the
overall earnings distribution is smooth. In the model, we focus on discrete labor supply
conditional on participating in the labor market, and, for simplicity, exclude the labor
market participation margin from the analysis.
5.2 Discrete vs. continuous model
First we simulate earnings distributions when the budget set includes an income notch,
a scenario that resembles our empirical case for university students. In this exercise, we
assume the parameters given in Table 3. The marginal income tax rate is set at 22% below
the notch and a high marginal tax rate of 61% is applied above the notch, constituting a
simplified linear version of the actual budget set for students including multiple notches
above the income threshold (see Figure 1). The size of the notch, i.e. the size of the drop
21The distribution is a combination of power distributions and normal distributions, which gives an
approximate match for the shape of the empirical earnings distribution of students in our empirical case.
Our results are not sensitive to different underlying ability distributions that roughly match the empirical
income distribution of students.
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in disposable income at the income threshold, is 500 euros. The notch is relocated from
9000 to 12,000 euros in the simulated reform.
Figure 7 shows the simulated earnings distributions within an income interval of
0–25,000 euros using the baseline continuous model and 0.2 as the value for the e param-
eter.22 The different panels in the figure present the baseline continuous model (panel a),
the continuous model supplemented with adjustment frictions (panel b) and with both
adjustment friction and optimization errors (panel c).23
First, we find that bunching at the income threshold is sharp and sizable both before
and after the reform in panel (a). Adding adjustment frictions to the model according
to equation (5) in panel (b) only leads to slightly smaller bunching and slightly more
individuals being located just above the notch, but no changes in earnings over a broader
income range. Adding i.i.d. earnings shocks as optimization errors in panel (c) yields
more diffuse bunching, but again no earnings responses over a wider income range below
the old income threshold.24
Next, we add discrete choices as an additional constraint. Figure 8 illustrates the
earnings distributions using 30, 15, 10 and 5 available earnings choices for each individual
and assuming an underlying e parameter of 0.5. With a discrete choice constraint included
in the model, the earnings distributions and the response to the reform qualitatively
resemble the empirical distributions (see Figure 3). In particular, when the number of
discrete choices is set at 10 (on average, earnings jumps of 2500 euros or 10–30% relative
to the baseline income level), the qualitative shape of the distributions largely resembles
their empirical counterparts. First, the earnings distribution shifts to the right from a
relatively wide income range below the old threshold. Second, the shape and amount of
excess bunching below the threshold are approximately of the same nature and order of
22Qualitative simulation results are not sensitive to the choice of the e parameter, except that with
higher parameter values the densities above the thresholds reduce.
23We assume heterogeneous adjustment frictions represented by a uniformly distributed parameter a
in the unit interval. Each individual has a different and independent draw from this distribution. The
earnings shocks related to optimization errors are normally distributed mean-zero income shocks with a
standard deviation of 800 euros.
24If we were to assume only negative income shocks we would obtain diffuse bunching only below the
notch, similarly as in the empirical distribution. However, such asymmetric shocks cannot be not easily
justified.
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magnitude as in our empirical case. Note that scattered bunching below the threshold
only results from including discrete earnings choices as a constraint, as this model does
not include optimization errors or adjustment frictions. Furthermore, when increasing
the number of available discrete locations the distributions begin to resemble those in
the continuous model, and with only a very small number of available choices both the
broader changes in the distribution and the bunching responses are small, as can be
expected.
Overall, these findings further support the conclusion in Section 4.1 that the canonical
continuous-choice model cannot explain our empirical findings, not even when comple-
mented with adjustment frictions or optimization errors. In contrast, we need a discrete
choice component in the model in order to be able to at least qualitatively explain the
earnings responses from far below the old income threshold. Nevertheless, other elements
such as optimization errors and inattention could also play a role in the observed re-
sponses of students, which might be needed in order to more precisely model the labor
supply behavior. However, the main point of this simulation exercise is to highlight that
a discrete component is required in order to even qualitatively model the discrete jumps
in earnings from below the threshold.
5.3 Tax elasticity estimation
In this section, we illustrate the impact of the labor supply model on elasticity estimation
and the potential biases therein based on the theoretical considerations presented in
Section 4.1. We highlight the implications of the labor supply adjustment process for
the elasticity estimates, and focus on the case where the continuous model is assumed
but actually labor supply is discrete. Moreover, we illustrate and discuss how mobility
elasticity estimates vary depending on the details of the tax reform and the number of
available discrete choices.
First, we discuss how the continuous versus discrete model would affect the reduced-
form methods for estimating the earnings elasticity. Typically, estimates for the ETI are
conducted using a DiD approach utilizing a treatment group facing a tax reform and
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a control group assumed to be unaffected or differentially affected by the reform (see
e.g. Saez et al. (2012) for more details of the typical estimation procedure). Therefore,
a crucial part of the estimation is how the treatment and control groups are defined.
Usually, the treatment group is selected to include only those individuals who face a tax
rate change based on their pre-reform earnings. Moreover, typically the control group is
individuals with slightly different (usually lower) pre-reform earnings, because it is not
possible to find a group of individuals with the exact same pre-reform earnings levels
as the treatment group, but who did not face a change in taxes. This is the case, for
example, in the seminal paper by Gruber and Saez (2002) and many subsequent studies.
In general, when the actual labor supply model is continuous, the above definitions
for the treatment and control groups can deliver an unbiased earnings elasticity estimate.
However, when labor supply is discrete instead of continuous, these definitions are not
necessarily consistent. In the discrete model, individuals outside the earnings region
where the tax reform occurs can respond to the reform, as discussed in Section 4.1. This
raises two main issues in the standard estimation. First, a typically defined treatment
group excludes those who could respond to the tax reform but were not located in the
earnings region where the tax rate change occurred before the reform, thus excluding part
of the actual earnings responses to the reform. Second, a typically defined control group
could include individuals who are in fact affected by the tax reform in a similar manner
as the treatment group, thus introducing another bias in the estimate.
Next, we illustrate the bias numerically using our simulation model and a simulated
tax reform. The benefit of using the simulation approach is that we can precisely observe
all the income responses in the simulated data, enabling us to track down the impact of
discrete responses and other sources of the bias on the elasticity estimate.
In the simulation, we utilize an underlying income distribution calibrated to match the
empirical distribution of the students (income range of 0–25,000 euros with mean income
of approximately 6000 euros). We simulate an institutional setting including a kinked tax
schedule where the marginal tax rate increases above a given income level. In our baseline
case, the tax schedule features a marginal income tax rate of 40% which jumps to 60% for
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earnings of 10,000 euros onward. We then introduce a reform that repeals this kink and
reduces the tax rate to 40% also from the 10,000 euro threshold onward. Therefore, this
set-up and the simulated reform would correspond to a large marginal tax rate cut for
higher incomes, in a similar vein as the widely studied Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the US
(Feldstein, 1999; Saez et al., 2012). In the baseline model, we assume an e parameter of
0.5 and 10 available discrete earnings choices for each individual, parameter values that
yield baseline simulation that qualitatively matches the observed earnings responses of
students to the study subsidy threshold reform. We later vary these parameters to show
the sensitivity of the results to them. Again, we focus on discrete labor supply choices
conditional on participating in the labor market and exclude the participation margin
from the model, which enables us to better compare the estimates to those derived in the
ETI literature that focuses on intensive margin earnings responses.
Formally, the standard ETI estimation is usually performed by regressing the change
in log income on the change in the log of the net-of-tax rate as follows
d log zit = εd log(1− τ)it + it (9)
where subscript i refers to the individual and t time, z (taxable) earnings, τ marginal tax
rate,  the error term, and ε is the estimated average earnings elasticity with respect to
the net-of-tax rate.
The empirical mobility elasticity formula we use in the analysis differs from this spec-
ification in two important ways. First, we account for the fact that when earnings choices
are discrete, individuals below the original kink point can also be affected by the reform.
We denote the tax rate (m) as the difference between net earnings relative to gross earn-
ings in different locations, as discussed in Section 4. Empirically, m can be calculated by
estimating the average change in income due to the reform by income bin and denoting
the initial earnings location as i − 1 and the new location (pre-reform income plus the
average change in income) as i. This implies that the change in the tax rate is poten-
tially non-zero for a large part of the earnings distribution also below the original kink.
Formally, the mobility elasticity is estimated with the following equation
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d log zit = ζd log(1−m)it + it (10)
where ζ denotes the average mobility elasticity.
Figure 9 illustrates the simulated earnings distributions in the discrete case before and
after the reform, and for a comparison, Figure 10 presents the distributions assuming
continuous choices. These figures show that there is a significant and sharp bunching
in the continuous case but no clear bunching in the discrete case prior to the repeal of
the tax rate kink. Furthermore, the shape of the earnings distribution changes over a
broader region below the kink point in the discrete case but no such changes occur in the
continuous case, similarly as in our empirical results for students.
To more clearly describe how individuals respond to the reform, Figure 11 presents
the individual-level earnings responses and incurred tax rate changes within the reform
for both the discrete and continuous cases. In the figure, the responses are denoted in
terms of pre-reform earnings using 200 euro income bins (horizontal axis). According to
the assumptions described above, in the continuous case the change in log earnings and
the change in the net-of-tax rate are zero for those originally below the kink. The change
in log earnings is a constant 0.2 above the kink point (except for a narrow local bunching
window just around the original kink point) and the change in the log of the net-of-tax
rate is 0.4 above the kink.25
These patterns are different in the discrete case. First, the change in the tax rate m
does not always coincide with the change in the marginal tax rate used in the continuous
model. The tax rate changes do coincide above the original kink because in the linear tax
system the change in taxes caused by jumping between two distinct earnings locations
equals the change stemming from a marginal earnings adjustment. However, unlike in
the continuous case, some individuals below the original kink also face a change in their
tax rate if their next available earnings location is above the kink point. Furthermore,
25The intuition for the continuous model remains similar if we include adjustment frictions in the
model as in Section 4.1. Under constant adjustment frictions, the behavioral responses would be smaller
above the kink, but there would be no behavioral responses for individuals below the original kink point.
Adding heterogeneous adjustment frictions across individuals would produce variation in the size of the
behavioral responses above the kink, but again no responses for individuals originally below it.
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the average change in the tax rate reduces the further we move below the original kink, as
the share of individuals with their next available earnings location above the kink point
reduces. Second, due to the changes in incentives also for individuals below the original
kink, the average change in log earnings is not zero in this earnings region in the discrete
case, as already discussed above.
Next, we estimate the earnings elasticities by plugging the simulated data representing
the earnings responses and tax incentive changes into equations (9) and (10). Figure 12
illustrates the average tax elasticities by pre-reform earnings using 200 euro bins. As can
be expected, the standard continuous model produces a constant elasticity estimate of
0.5 above the kink point, which equals the chosen e parameter in the simulation model.
In contrast, the mobility elasticity estimate in the discrete model is smaller and not
constant across the distribution. On average, the mobility elasticity is 0.14, and 0.2
above the original kink and 0.12 below it.
As explained above, quasi-experimental ETI estimates could be biased when assuming
the continuous model but when the actual earnings responses are discrete. Figure 12
illustrates this by showing how the estimated elasticity would change when treating those
directly below the kink point as a control group. Then, we would effectively subtract their
earnings elasticity from that of the treatment group that was originally located above the
kink point. As also those who were below the location of the kink can respond to the
reform when the choices are discrete, this method could induce a significant downward
bias in the elasticity estimate, illustrated in Figure 12. Note that if the actual responses
were continuous, there would be no such bias in the estimate because in that case the
earnings responses and the earnings elasticity below the kink are zero.
Next, we characterize the extent of this bias in the “naive” DiD estimate utilizing
simulated microdata and the estimation methods described above. In the naive estima-
tor, define the treatment group as those individuals who were above the kink based on
their pre-reform earnings, and as the control group those individuals whose pre-reform
earnings were within an income range of 8000 euros below the kink to the kink. We also
estimate the mobility elasticity using equation (10) where we consider as treated all those
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individuals who face a tax rate change irrespective of their pre-reform earnings, similarly
as above in Figure 12.
Table 4 collects the estimates when assuming the discrete case with 10 available earn-
ings choices and varying the location of the original kink point. The results show that the
naive ETI estimate is always smaller than the mobility elasticity estimate, demonstrat-
ing the downward bias in the estimate stemming from the earnings responses of those
below the kink in the control group. A comparison between the naive ETI and mobility
elasticity estimates in Table 4 suggests that the size of this bias can be notable. Using
the baseline specification where the original kink is located at 10,000 euros, the mobility
elasticity estimate is almost twice as large as the naive ETI estimate (0.177 vs. 0.098).
Furthermore, in Table 4 both the naive ETI and mobility elasticity estimates are
consistently smaller in the discrete model than in the baseline continuous model (elasticity
0.5). As we have calibrated our discrete model to approximately match the empirical
results for students, we believe that this results would represent what would happen in
many actual empirical settings. Therefore, discrete earnings constraints could constitute
a feasible reason for why many empirical studies find small or moderate ETI estimates
(see Saez et al. 2012 and Neisser 2019), even when the estimation does not suffer from
the downward bias discussed here. However, this feature is sensitive to the parameters
chosen in the simulation model, and when the tax reform occurs at lower income levels
and when we increase the number of available earnings choices, the elasticity estimates
in the discrete framework can even exceed those estimated from the continuous model.
We discuss reasons for this below.
Tables A3–A5 in Appendix A present the estimates when varying the number of
available earnings choices and the location of the original kink point. First, we can
observe that the higher the original kink is in the income distribution the lower is the
mobility elasticity estimate. In the simulation model the available earnings locations
are closer to each other at lower income levels, and thus a larger number of individuals
change their earnings locations as a response to the reform, thus leading to a larger
mobility elasticity estimate. Relatedly, the bias in the naive ETI estimate is smaller the
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less discrete the earnings choices are. Therefore, the degree of discreteness provides a
reason for why empirically the earnings elasticity estimates are likely to be larger in cases
where individuals can easily adjust their earnings, such as for business owners and top
income earners, as is typically observed in the empirical literature (Saez et al., 2012;
Neisser, 2019). This is because both the estimates are less downward biased and the true
responses are larger.
Furthermore, in a study related to ours Kreiner et al. (2015) find that the earnings
elasticity might be larger in the long run than in short run in their model with discrete
job-search behavior, which resembles our discrete labor supply model. The mechanism
Kreiner et al. (2015) illustrate is that with a discrete number of alternative choices
individuals respond by making larger jumps in their earnings when they switch between
jobs compared to a standard continuous model. Our simulations are in line with this,
but also show that a significant fraction of individuals do not respond at all to changes
in tax incentives because of a larger distance between the available earnings locations
in the discrete model. Thus the average labor supply response could be either larger or
smaller under the discrete compared to the continuous model depending on which of the
mechanisms dominate. In our simulation calibrated to match the empirical data, it seems
that the latter effect dominates and the average income elasticity is reduced when the
available earnings choice set is sufficiently discrete.
Overall, our main finding from these simulations is that the interpretation of the DiD
elasticity estimates in earlier studies can be very sensitive to the underlying labor market
constraints and the labor supply mechanisms. If the actual responses are discrete they
can create a significant bias when using standard methods based on the assumption of
continuous labor supply to estimate the elasticity. Nevertheless, this bias is not relevant
for all quasi-experimental tax elasticity estimators. For example, the literature studying
the impact of the earned income tax credit (EITC) on earnings in the US typically
applies an estimation strategy where women without children are used as a control group
for women with children, who are eligible for larger tax credits (see Kleven (2019) for
a recent review). In these types of set-ups, the control group is typically unaffected by
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the changes in taxes occurring for the treatment group, implying that potential discrete
responses do not bias the estimates in this case.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we found clear reduced-form evidence of discrete labor supply determining
the responses to changes in tax incentives. We found that a reform that shifted the loca-
tion of an income notch for Finnish higher education students led to widespread earnings
responses over a wide income range below the notch. We argue that this finding is not
consistent with a continuous labor supply model even when augmented with adjustment
costs such as search frictions, but the responses are consistent with a simple discrete
labor supply model. Given that university students often work in more temporary labor
markets associated with short-term contracts and flexible working hours, we think that
discrete labor supply is an even more relevant mechanism for labor markets in general
where contracts are more often permanent and established. Thus we argue that discrete-
ness of labor supply is a relevant component to consider in all models that analyze labor
supply behavior.
Furthermore, we analyzed the implications of discrete labor supply on empirical es-
timation methods and the magnitude of the income elasticity with respect to income
taxes. We found that standard differences-in-differences and bunching methods for es-
timating the elasticity need to be adjusted when the labor supply is discrete. Discrete
labor supply choices expand the group of individuals who are potentially affected by tax
rate changes, and consequently narrow down the group of individuals who can be used
as a valid control group. We found that not taking this issue into consideration could
result in a significant downward bias in the elasticity estimate. Also the relevant tax rate
concept for the elasticity changes from marginal tax rate to average tax rate when choices
are discrete.
Our results also have direct welfare implications, because they affect the interpretation
of how large is the underlying structural elasticity which is the concept used in welfare
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measurements. If discreteness is a permanent constraint in the labor supply model, the
observed empirical elasticity is also the underlying structural elasticity and thus the suf-
ficient statistics for welfare analysis. This is unlike with other optimization frictions that
could only temporarily reduce the elasticity, and thus create a wedge between observed
empirical and underlying structural elasticity. We argued that the functioning of the
labor markets that cause the discreteness in labor supply could be permanent features,
such as the need to form contracts between employers and employees. If some of the
discreteness could be changed, that could be a policy tool in itself affecting welfare, as
argued by Bastani et al. (2015).
In principle, discreteness could either reduce or increase the true elasticity. In our
simulation model calibrated to match our empirical data, we found that the average
income elasticity is reduced compared to the continuous model when the available earnings
choice set is sufficiently discrete. In a small set of simulations we found the opposite case
that the elasticity increased, but we regard these as less relevant for describing the average
responsiveness of the workforce to income taxes.
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Notes: Figure presents the study subsidy schedule before (gray solid line) and after 2008 (black dashed
line) for a student who collects the default 9 subsidy months. The vertical axis denotes disposable
income, and horizontal axis labor income. The vertical lines denote the thresholds before (9200 euros)
and after (12,070 euros) the 2008 reform. Above the income threshold one month of the study subsidy
is reclaimed, resulting in a discontinuous drop in disposable income. Furthermore, an additional month
of the subsidy is reclaimed after an additional 1010 and 1310 euros above the threshold before and after
2008, respectively. The figure illustrates the distinctive change in incentives caused by the increase in
the income threshold in 2008, highlighting that the reform encouraged students to increase their earnings
above the old income threshold.
Figure 1: Disposable income at different income levels for students with 9 subsidy months
in 2007 and 2008
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(a) Local bunching
(b) Broader changes in the distribution
Notes: Graph (a) illustrates the excess bunching at the income threshold in a hypothetical earnings
(z) distribution (gray solid line), compared to an estimated counterfactual distribution in the absence
of the threshold (black dashed line). In the figure, the threshold is denoted by z∗, and zL and zH
denote the lower and upper limits of the bunching region. The counterfactual is estimated by fitting a
flexible polynomial function to the observed distribution excluding the area close to the notch between
zL and zH from the regression. Excess bunching is estimated by relating the share of individuals in
the bunching region (zL, z∗) to the counterfactual density. See Appendix B for more details on the
bunching estimation. Graph (b) illustrates broader changes in a hypothetical earnings distribution after
an increase in the location of the threshold. The pre-reform distribution is marked with a gray solid line
and the post-reform distribution with a black dashed line. zL and zH denote the lower and upper limits
of the estimation region. Broader changes in the distribution are estimated by relating the observed
relative density before the reform to the relative density after the reform in the income range between
the lower and upper limits. See Section 2.3 for more details on the estimation method.
Figure 2: Estimating bunching and broader changes in the earnings distribution
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Notes: Figure presents the observed relative earnings distributions before the reform in 2006–2007 (gray
solid line) and after the reform in 2008–2009 (black dashed line) within an income range of 0–18,000 euros
in bins of 100 euros for students with the default 9 subsidy months in each year, and for young part-time
workers who are not students (see Table 2). The first vertical line at 0 denotes the lower limit in the
estimation of broader earnings changes in the distribution estimated using equation (2), and the second
and third lines denote the pre- and post-reform income thresholds, respectively. The figure illustrates
that the earnings distribution after 2008 has a clearly different shape than before the reform, implying
that the income threshold affects the shape of the whole labor income distribution, not just the region
close to the notch point. The differences-in-differences estimate for broader changes in the distribution
within an income range of 0–9200 euros is 9.81 (standard error 1.01). The estimate for broader changes
among the student population only is 10.97 (1.85), estimated using equation (1). The bunching estimates
at the threshold are 2.93 (0.88) before and 1.71 (0.88) after 2008, respectively. A lower limit of 1100
euros below the threshold is used in the bunching estimation both before and after 2008. See Appendix
B for a more detailed analysis of bunching responses.
Figure 3: Earnings distributions of students and non-student part-time workers before
and after the 2008 reform
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(b) Other young part-time workers
Notes: Figure presents the income distributions of students with 9 subsidy months (graph a) and
other young part-time workers (graph b) in 2004–2005 (gray dashed line), 2006–2007 (gray solid line),
2008–2009 (black solid line) and 2010–2011 (black dotted line) within an income range of 0–18,000 euros
in bins of 100 euros. The figure shows that the earnings responses of students occurred exactly at the
time of the 2008 reform, and that the response is not caused by any gradual changes in the shape of
the distribution over time. The distribution for other young part-time workers remained almost un-
changed throughout the time period 2004–2011. However, there are similar minor changes at the bottom
of distributions of both the treatment and control groups from 2004–2005 to 2006-2007, which further
strengthens the case that the distributions develop similarly over time in the absence of the reform.
Figure 4: Income distributions of students and other young part-time workers in
2004–2011
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Notes: Graph (a) presents the average individual-level changes in real log labor income (relative to the
2007 real price index) with 95% standard errors in base-year bins of 3000 euros for students with 9
subsidy months. Gray solid line represents the years 2007–2008, and black dashed lines the pre-reform
years 2005–2006 and 2006–2007. The graph shows that earnings increases are more prevalent below
the new threshold at the time of the reform compared to previous years, but there are no significant
differences above the new income threshold. Graph (b) presents the average likelihood and 95% standard
errors for increasing labor income by 50% or more relative to base-year income. The graph illustrates
that the likelihood of large income increases is significantly higher below the old threshold at the time
of the reform compared to previous years, but there are no significant changes above the old threshold
between the years. Graph (c) presents the average likelihood and 95% standard errors for locating above
the old income threshold in the next year. The graph shows that this likelihood increased significantly
in bins below the new threshold, but there are no significant changes between the years at larger income
levels. Overall, these findings support the view that students responded to the relocation of the notch
with large intensive-margin earnings increases instead of marginal earnings adjustments along the whole
distribution.
Figure 5: Panel data evidence of individual-level earnings responses
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Notes: Figure presents the observed relative earnings distributions before the reform in 2006–2007 (gray
solid line) and after the reform in 2008–2009 (black dashed line) within an income range of 0–18,000 euros
in bins of 100 euros for students with the default 9 subsidy months in each year working in different types
of jobs. Jobs are categorized using firm-level industry classification codes. Less discrete labor markets
include restaurants, bars and cafes, cleaning and security services, and retail sales such as supermarkets
and gas stations. More discrete labor markets include public sector, and research, manufacturing and
construction in the private sector. Using equation (1), the estimate for broader changes in the distribution
within an income range of 0–9,200 euros for the less discrete group is 6.14(1.71), and for the more discrete
group 10.94(1.10), illustrating that broader changes in the distribution are significantly more prevalent
for the latter group compared to the first group.
Figure 6: Labor income distributions before and after 2008 for students working in less
discrete and more discrete labor markets
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(a) Baseline continuous model
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(b) Adjustment frictions
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(c) Earnings shocks and adjustment frictions
Notes: Figure presents simulated income distributions before (gray solid line) and after (black dashed
line) an increase in the location of the income threshold from 9000 euros to 12,000 euros within an income
range of 0–18,000 euros. The underlying e parameter of 0.2 is used in the simulations. Qualitative results
are not sensitive to the choice of this parameter value, except that with higher parameter values the
densities above the thresholds reduce. Graph (a) presents the standard continuous-choice model. Graph
(b) presents the standard model with adjustment frictions and graph (c) includes both adjustment
frictions and unexpected i.i.d shocks in earnings to the standard model. The graphs illustrate that these
frictions typically discussed in the literature can induce mitigated and scattered bunching around the
threshold, but they do not produce broader changes in the earnings distributions we observed in Figure
3.
Figure 7: Simulated income distributions in the baseline continuous model and with
different types of adjustment frictions
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Notes: Figure presents simulated earnings distributions before (gray solid line) and after (black dashed
line) an increase in the location of the income threshold from 9000 euros to 12,000 euros within an
income range of 0–18,000 euros using different options for an available discrete earnings choice set. The
underlying e parameter of 0.5 is used in the simulations. Using 30 location choices produces distinctive
bunching at the threshold, and limited changes in the distribution at lower income levels. In contrast,
using 15 or 10 choices produces more limited bunching and more prevalent responses at lower income
levels, in a qualitatively similar manner as in Figure 3. However, using only 5 available choices reduces
both local responses and broader changes in the distribution, which is inconsistent with our empirical
observations.
Figure 8: Simulated income distributions with different discrete choice sets
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Notes: Figure presents the simulated earnings distributions before (gray dashed line) and after (black
solid line) the removal of a tax rate kink at 10,000 euros (dashed vertical line). Horizontal axis denotes
pre-reform income, and net income denotes the net-of-tax income (right-hand side vertical axis) before
and after the removal of the kink. The marginal tax rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before
the removal of the kink. The underlying e parameter of 0.5 and the assumption of 10 available earnings
choices within 0–25,000 euros are used in the simulation.
Figure 9: Simulated income distributions with 10 discrete choices before and after the
removal of a tax rate kink
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Notes: Figure presents the simulated earnings distributions before (gray dashed line) and after (black
solid line) the removal of a tax rate kink at 10,000 euros. Horizontal axis denotes pre-reform income in
bins of 200 euros, and net income denotes the net-of-tax income (right-hand side vertical axis) before
and after the removal of the kink. The marginal tax rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before
the removal of the kink. The underlying e parameter of 0.5 and the assumption of continuous earnings
choices within 0–25,000 euros are used in the simulation.
Figure 10: Simulated income distributions with continuous earnings before and after the
removal of a tax rate kink
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Notes: Figure presents the simulated changes in log income and tax rates for the continuous and discrete
models after the removal of a tax rate kink at 10,000 euros using an underlying e parameter of 0.5. The
marginal tax rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before the removal of the kink. Horizontal
axis denotes pre-reform income in bins of 200 euros. Gray dashed line denotes the change in income
in the continuous model, and solid black line in the discrete model with 10 available earnings choices
within an income range of 0–25,000 euros. Long-dashed red line denotes the change in the net-of-tax
rate in the continuous model, and the short-dashed blue line the average change in the average tax
rate between the available earnings locations. Based on the assumptions in the continuous model, only
individuals with pre-reform income above the original kink point respond to the reform, as only their
net-of-tax rate is assumed to be affected by the reform. In the discrete model, a fraction of individuals
in income bins below the kink also respond if their next available earnings location is above the original
kink. Consequently, the average tax rates are also affected for those individuals below the kink, but the
average change is smaller than in the continuous model above the kink. The average change in tax rate
in the discrete model equals the average change in the continuous model above the kink by definition.
Furthermore, in the baseline continuous model, all individuals are assumed to respond to the reform
with a similar earnings response above the kink. In the discrete model, a smaller share of individuals
respond with a discrete jump in earnings depending on the locations of the available earnings choices,
constituting a smaller average earnings response compared to the continuous model above the kink.
Figure 11: Changes in log income and net-of-tax rate in continuous and discrete models
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Notes: Figure presents the simulated elasticity estimates associated with the responses to the removal of
a tax rate kink at 10,000 euros in the discrete and continuous models using an underlying e parameter
of 0.5. The marginal tax rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before the removal of the kink.
Horizontal axis denotes pre-reform income in bins of 200 euros. Solid black line denotes the average bin-
level mobility elasticity estimates estimated with 10 available discrete earnings choices. Gray dashed line
denotes the standard elasticity estimates from the continuous model. The standard continuous average
elasticity estimate is 0.5 above the kink, which exactly equals the assumed e parameter in the model. The
average mobility elasticity is 0.14, and the average estimate is 0.12 below the kink (B) and 0.2 above it
(A), on average. These numbers imply that when earnings choices are discrete, the true elasticity estimate
can be significantly different from what we would predict based on the canonical continuous model. Also,
the figure presents an illustration of the bias in the standard differences-in-differences elasticity estimate
when using those below the removed kink as a control group. The standard differences-in-differences
approach would simply subtract the elasticity (or earnings responses) below the kink from that above
it (A–B), producing a downward-biased estimate. However, if the underlying earnings responses are
continuous, no such bias emerges when using those below the kink (elasticity=0) as a control group.
Figure 12: Elasticity estimates in discrete and continuous models and the bias in the
standard differences-in-differences estimate
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, all students 1999–2013
Individual characteristics
Age Female Labor income Labor income > 500
Mean 23.8 .58 8446 .80
Median 23 1 6306 1
sd 4.23 .49 8197 .40
N 2,417,517 2,417,517 2,078,538 2,417,517
One employer Study subsidy months 9 subsidy months Years studied
Mean .55 8.02 .42 2.2
Median 1 9 0 2
sd .50 2.64 .49 1.80
N 1,863,702 2,417,517 2,417,517 2,098,485
Field of industry
Manufacturing Hospitality services Admin. & Public Sector Other/missing
Mean .19 .16 .39 .25
sd .40 .37 .49 .43
N 2,417,517 2,417,517 2,417,517 2,417,517
Field of study
Arts & Humanities Business & Soc. Science Tech., Health & Soc. Serv. Other/missing
Mean .17 .19 .34 .29
sd .38 .39 .47 .42
N 2,417,517 2,417,517 2,417,517 2,417,517
Notes: Table presents the descriptive statistics for all students in 1999–2013, excluding first-year students
and those who graduate within a given year. Labor income > 500 denotes the share of students with
annual labor income above 500 euros. One employer denotes the share of students who we observe to
work for only one employer within a year among those with information on the employer in the data. 9
subsidy months denotes the share of students with the default study subsidy choice.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, non-student part-time workers, 1999–2013
Individual characteristics
Age Female Labor income Labor income > 500 One employer
Mean 21 .56 8318 .93 .62
Median 21 1 6741 1 1
sd 1.710 .496 7229 .25 .48
N 940,786 940,786 932,572 940,786 940,786
Field of industry
Manufacturing Hospitality services Admin. & Public Sector Other/missing
Mean .31 .22 .41 .06
sd .46 .41 .49 .24
N 940,786 940,786 940,786 940,786
Notes: Table presents the descriptive statistics for young, non-student part-time workers used in Figure
3. The group of non-student part-time workers is selected to roughly match students’ job and age
characteristics. The non-student group comprises individuals who we observe to have less than 12
working months per year in the data, and who are 19–24 years old. The age interval is chosen to match
between the 25–75 percentile points of the students’ age distribution. Labor income > 500 denotes the
share of individuals with annual labor income above 500 euros. One employer denotes the share of
individuals who we observe to work for only one employer within a year among those with information
on the employer in the data.
Table 3: Parameter values in the simulation model for the income threshold reform
Parameter Value
Marginal tax rate (τ)
Below the notch 0.22
Above the notch 0.61
Size of the notch 500e
Virtual income (R)
Before 4100e
After 3600e
Location of the notch (income threshold)
Before 9000e
After 12,000e
Notes: Table presents the parameter values used in the simulation model. The parameter values are
selected to approximate the actual budget set faced by students under the study subsidy program (see
Figure 1).
58
Table 4: Simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different estimation approaches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Location of the kink kink 15k kink 10k kink 5k kink 0
Naive ETI -0.0153 0.0978 0.0833 -
Standard error (0.000923) (0.000839) (0.000995)
Mobility elasticity 0.0812 0.177 0.320 0.551
Standard error (0.000292) (0.000406) (0.000563) (0.000968)
N 3,964,692 3,959,764 3,959,070 4,000,000
R2 0.019 0.046 0.076 0.075
Notes: Table collects the simulated earnings elasticity estimates using 10 available discrete locations for
each individual and an assumed e parameter of 0.5, and varying the location of the kink. The marginal
tax rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before the removal of the kink. The naive ETI estimates
are estimated by regressing the change in the log of earnings on the change in the log of the net-of-tax rate
using individuals below the original kink point as a control group for those individuals originally above
the kink. In columns (1) and (2), individuals from an income range of 8000 euros below the kink are
used as controls, and in column (3) all individuals below the kink are included in the control group. This
estimate cannot be measured when the original kink is at zero pre-reform earnings in column (4). The
mobility elasticity regresses the observed simulated change in the log income on the change in the net-of-
average tax rates between the discrete earnings locations. Table shows that the naive ETI estimates are
downward-biased compared to the underlying unbiased mobility elasticity estimates, stemming from the
fact that a fraction of the control group below the kink also increase their earnings after the simulated
reform. Second, the mobility elasticity estimate increases the lower the location of the original kink in
the distribution is, as at lower income levels there is, on average, a larger number of available earnings
locations above the kink point where individuals can relocate themselves after the reform.
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Notes: Figure presents the re-weighted relative earnings distributions before the reform in 2006–2007
(gray solid line) and after the reform in 2008–2009 (black dashed line) within an income range of 0–18,000
euros in bins of 200 euros for students with the default 9 subsidy months in each year. Bin-level inverse
probability weighting is used to re-weight the annual distributions using 2006 as the base year. The
re-weighting procedure utilizes four groups for both the field of industry and field of study, and three age
groups based on age terciles. Using equation (1), the estimate for broader changes in the distribution
within an income range of 0–9200 euros is 11.40 (1.01), which is similar to that estimated in the baseline
case in Figure 3 in the main text.
Figure A1: Re-weighted income distributions in 2006–2007 and 2008–2009.
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Notes: Figure presents the observed relative earnings distributions before the reform in 2006–2007 (gray
solid line) and after the reform in 2008–2009 (black dashed line) within an income range of 0–18,000
euros in bins of 200 euros for students with 7–11 subsidy months. The figure shows that broader changes
in the distribution are prevalent when including students who deviate from the default choice of 9
subsidy months. However, as the number of subsidy months defines the location of the income threshold,
changes in the distribution are more scattered over the distribution compared to our baseline case with
9 subsidy months in Figure 3 in the main text. Also, a fraction of students who choose other than 9
subsidy months bunch at their associated income thresholds, which appear as additional spikes in the
distribution. Relatedly, as the location of the thresholds both before and after 2008 is not constant in
this population, we cannot estimate a measure for broader changes in the distribution for this population
following the procedures introduced in Section 2.3.
Figure A2: Income distributions in 2006–2007 and 2008–2009, students with 7–11 subsidy
months.
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Notes: Figure presents the distribution of study subsidy months in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. In each
year, the default 9 months of the subsidy is the most common choice. There are no significant changes
in the distribution over time. This indicates that students responded to the reform of 2008 by changing
their earnings, but not, on average, by claiming more or less subsidies per year.
Figure A3: Distributions of study subsidy months, 2006–2009.
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(a) Continuous model
(b) Discrete model
Notes: Figure graphically illustrates the conceptual differences between the continuous and discrete
models when an income notch changes its location. The horizontal axis denotes gross earnings (z) and
the vertical axis net earnings (z − T (z)). In the continuous model in graph (a), the indifference curves
are drawn such that an individual would bunch at the original notch, and shifts her location to the
right when the location of the notch is increased. By definition, individuals below the original notch
are unaffected by the reform. The discrete model in graph (b) includes the same budget set, but the
individual now faces a constraint that only certain discrete earnings locations are feasible, marked with
black squares in the figure. Under the old location of the notch, the individual would be located in the
first possible earnings level below the notch. When the notch is relocated, the next discrete location
above the notch becomes more attractive. The main differences between the continuous and discrete
models in the figure are that the earnings response is greater in the discrete model and it also occurs
from a region below the original notch.
Figure A4: Relocation of the notch in continuous and discrete models
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Notes: Figure presents the underlying earnings distribution used in the simulation model. The distribu-
tion is a combination of a power distribution and a normal distribution, which delivers an approximate
match for the shape of the empirical earnings distribution of students in our empirical analysis. The
simulation results are not sensitive to different underlying ability distributions that roughly match the
empirical income distribution of students.
Figure A5: Simulated earnings distribution in the absence of taxes
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Notes: Figure presents the underlying probability distribution of discrete earnings choices utilized in the
discrete choice model simulations. The large mass in the probability distribution at small earnings ensures
that each individual has at least one available choice that produces positive utility with positive earnings.
The thick tail in the distribution ensures that there is another available choice at a higher income level,
although the specific location of this choice can vary across different draws. In the simulation procedure,
we iterate the model multiple times, and in each round draw new available earnings choices. The resulting
earnings distribution for the full population is continuous, although one individual faces only a discrete
and limited number of available choices.
Figure A6: Probability distribution of discrete earnings choices
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Tables
Table A1: Income thresholds before and after the 2008 reform
Before 2008 (academic year 2006/2007) After 2008 (academic year 2008/2009)
Study subsidy months Income threshold Relative income
loss at the margin
if the threshold is
exceeded
Income threshold Relative income
loss at the margin
the threshold is
exceeded
1 17,340 3.1% 22,550 2.5%
2 16,330 3.2% 21,190 2.7%
3 15,320 3.5% 19,930 2.9%
4 14,310 3.7% 18,620 3.1%
5 13,300 4.0% 17,310 3.3%
6 12,290 4.3% 16,000 3.6%
7 11,280 4.7% 14,690 3.9%
8 10,270 5.2% 13,380 4.3%
9 9260 5.7% 12,070 4.8%
10 8250 6.4% 10,760 5.3%
11 7240 7.3% 9450 6.1%
12 6230 8.5% 8140 7.1%
Note: Table presents the annual income thresholds in euros for different subsidy months before and after
the 2008 reform. The highlighted 9 months of the subsidy is the default choice. The relative income
loss from marginally exceeding the income threshold is calculated using the full study subsidy (461 euros
and 500 euros before and after 2008, respectively) plus 15% interest collected by the Social Insurance
Institution if the subsidy is reclaimed due to exceeding the income threshold.
Table A2: Variables used in the mobility elasticity estimation for students
Avg. gross earnings Avg. net income below notch Avg. net income above notch Differences in net incomes
(2000—18,000e) (2000–9300e) (9300–18,000) between avg. locations
2007 7116 8693 12,173 3534
2008 7529 8785 13,592 4807
Gross earnings below: 6008 Gross earnings above: 11,821
Notes: Table presents the variables used when calculating the mobility elasticity estimate for students in
Section 4.2 in the main text. Mobility elasticity is measured by relating the log change in average gross
earnings to the log change in the difference in net income between the two average earnings locations
below and above the original notch. Net earnings are calculated using the SISU microsimulation model.
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Table A3: Simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different discrete earnings choices
and the original kink point at 5000 euros
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of discrete choices 5 10 15 20 30
Naive ETI -0.133 0.0833 0.197 0.263 0.337
Standard error (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Mobility elasticity 0.273 0.320 0.356 0.375 0.402
Standard error (0.00096) (0.0006) (0.000434) (0.0004) (0.0003)
N 3,886,794 3,959,070 3,980,080 3,988,928 3,995,258
R2 0.020 0.076 0.145 0.218 0.371
Notes: Table collects the simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different available discrete earnings
locations for each individual (5, 10, 15, 20, 30) and an assumed e parameter of 0.5. The marginal tax
rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before the removal of the kink located at 5000 euros. The
naive ETI estimates are estimated by regressing the change in the log of earnings on the change in the
log of the net-of-tax rate using individuals below the original kink point as a control group for those
individuals originally above the kink. The mobility elasticity regresses the observed simulated change in
the log income on the change in the net-of-average tax rates between the discrete earnings locations.
Table A4: Simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different discrete earnings choices
and the original kink point at 10,000 euros
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of discrete choices 5 10 15 20 30
Naive ETI -0.011 0.0978 0.190 0.250 0.319
Standard error (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Mobility elasticity 0.128 0.177 0.214 0.239 0.281
Standard error (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
N 3,885,732 3,959,764 3,980,158 3,988,936 3,995,260
R2 0.010 0.046 0.100 0.163 0.301
Notes: Table collects the simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different available discrete earnings
locations for each individual (5, 10, 15, 20, 30) and an assumed e parameter of 0.5. The marginal tax
rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before the removal of the kink located at 10,000 euros.
The naive ETI estimates are estimated by regressing the change in the log of earnings on the change in
the log of the net-of-tax rate using individuals below the original kink in an income range of 8000 euros
below the kink as a control group for those individuals originally above the kink. The mobility elasticity
regresses the observed simulated change in the log income on the change in the net-of-average tax rates
between the discrete earnings locations.
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Table A5: Simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different discrete earnings choices
and the original kink point at 15,000 euros
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of discrete choices 5 10 15 20 30
Naive ETI -0.0289 -0.0153 0.0194 0.0586 0.130
Standard error (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Mobility elasticity 0.0580 0.0812 0.0987 0.115 0.143
Standard error (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
N 3,907,916 3,964,692 3,981,306 3,989,246 3,995,290
R2 0.004 0.019 0.041 0.074 0.159
Notes: Table collects the simulated earnings elasticity estimates using different available discrete earnings
locations for each individual (5, 10, 15, 20, 30) and an assumed e parameter of 0.5. The marginal tax
rate below the kink is 40% and 60% above it before the removal of the kink located at 10,000 euros.
The naive ETI estimates are estimated by regressing the change in the log of earnings on the change in
the log of the net-of-tax rate using individuals below the original kink in an income range of 8000 euros
below the kink as a control group for those individuals originally above the kink. The mobility elasticity
regresses the observed simulated change in the log income on the change in the net-of-average tax rates
between the discrete earnings locations.
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Appendix B
Bunching estimation.
Behavioral responses to local discontinuous changes in the budget set, such as tax rate kinks or
notches, are predominantly estimated in the recent literature using a bunching methodology (see
Kleven (2016) for a summary). Intuitively, if a discontinuous jump in incentives affects earnings,
we should find an excess mass of individuals located just below the threshold in the earnings
distribution. The excess bunching thus captures the earnings distortions created by the threshold
in the absence of optimization frictions and when earnings choices are continuous. Saez (2010)
and Kleven and Waseem (2013) show that under certain restrictions and within the continuous
labor supply model, the bunching estimate can be translated into an average earnings elasticity,
representing a relevant parameter for the welfare analysis of taxes and income transfers.
We measure local responses to the notch caused by the income threshold following the
bunching method presented in Kleven and Waseem (2013). The local counterfactual density is
estimated by fitting a flexible polynomial function to the observed distribution, excluding an
area around the study subsidy income threshold z∗ from the observed income distribution. We
group students into income bins of 100 euros and then estimate a counterfactual density by
excluding the region [zL, zH ] around the threshold from the regression:
cj =
p∑
i=0
βi(zj)
i +
zH∑
i=zL
ηi · 1(zj = i) + εj (11)
where cj is the count of individuals in bin j, and zj denotes the income level in bin j. The
order of the polynomial is denoted by p. Thus the fitted values for the counterfactual density
are given by cˆj =
∑p
i=0 βi(zj)
i. The excess bunching is then estimated by relating the actual
number of students close to the threshold within (zL, z∗) to the estimated counterfactual density
in the same region:
bˆ(z∗) =
∑z∗
i=zL
(cj − cˆj)∑z∗
i=zL
cˆj/Nj
(12)
where Nj is the number of bins within [zL, z∗].
Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we set the lower limit of the excluded region (zL)
based on visual observations of the income distribution to represent the point in the distribution
where the bunching behavior begins, i.e. when the density begins to increase. We determine zH
such that the estimated excess mass, bˆE(z∗) = (
∑z∗
i=zL
cj−cˆj), equals the estimated missing mass
above the threshold, bˆM (z∗) = (
∑zH
i=z>z∗ cˆj − cj), stemming from individuals who would locate
above the income threshold in the absence of it and who respond to the notch by bunching below
it, illustrated in Figure 2 in the main text. We apply this convergence condition by starting
from a small value of zH and increasing it gradually until bˆE(z∗) ≈ bˆM (z∗). This convergence
condition also defines the marginal buncher student with income z∗ + 4z, representing the
student with highest earnings in the absence of the notch who responds by locating below the
income threshold.
Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we calculate standard errors by using a residual-
based bootstrap procedure. We generate a large number of income distributions by randomly
resampling the residuals from equation (11) with replacement, and generate a large number of
new estimates of the counterfactual density based on the resampled distributions. Based on
the bootstrapped counterfactual densities, we evaluate variation in the bunching estimate. The
standard error is defined as the standard deviation in the distribution of the estimate.
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Bunching responses.
We find clear local responses to the income threshold of the study subsidy program. Figure B1
presents the gross income distribution and the counterfactual distribution relative to the notch
in bins of 100 euros in the range of +/- 6000 euros from the notch in 1999–2013. The dashed
vertical line denotes the notch point above which a student loses one month of the subsidy. The
solid vertical lines denote the excluded range used in the estimation of the counterfactual, which
is estimated using a 7th-order polynomial function. The dash-point vertical line above the notch
shows the upper limit for the dominated region just above the notch where students can increase
their net income by lowering their gross income subject to the income threshold.
Figure B1 indicates a visually clear and statistically significant excess mass (2.19 (0.189 ))
below the income threshold for all students (standard error in parenthesis). This implies that
students are both aware of the notch and respond to the strong local incentives created by
it. In addition, there is clear evidence of the existence of some types of frictions. There is
an economically and statistically significant mass of students, 0.915(.027 ) of the mass relative
to the counterfactual, at the locally dominated region just above the notch where no students
should locate in the absence of any types of frictions or constraints and when earnings choices are
continuous (Kleven and Waseem 2013). Furthermore, even though the study subsidy schedule
ultimately consists of multiple notches, we observe a distinctive response only to the first income
threshold they face.
Figure B2 shows the bunching responses before (1999–2007) and after (2008–2013) the 2008
reform.The figure shows that excess bunching is slightly larger before (2.55 (0.228 )) than after
(1.71 (0.882 )) the reform. One explanation for this is that the incentives not to exceed the notch
are somewhat smaller after 2008, since the relative significance of losing one month’s subsidy
in terms of disposable income is now smaller than before 2008 when the threshold was at a
lower income level. However, as discussed in Section 2 in the main text, this standard bunching
method is not a valid measure for estimating labor supply responses to tax incentives under the
discrete choice constraint, and therefore these estimates need to be interpreted as suggestive.
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Notes: Figure presents the observed earnings distribution (gray solid line) and the estimated counterfac-
tual distribution (black dashed line) around the income threshold (denoted by zero in the figure) in bins
of 100 euros for all students using pooled data from 1999–2013. The first and second solid vertical lines
denote the lower and upper limits of the excluded region when estimating the counterfactual distribution.
The counterfactual is estimated using a seventh-order polynomial. The dotted vertical line denotes the
upper limit of the region of dominated choice just above the threshold. The estimate for excess bunching
at the notch is 2.19 (0.189), and the estimate for the mass at the dominate region is 0.915 (0.027).
Figure B1: Bunching at the study subsidy notch, 1999–2013
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Notes: Figure presents the observed earnings distributions (gray solid line) and the estimated counterfac-
tual distributions (black dashed line) around the income threshold (denoted by zero in the figure) in bins
of 100 euros for all students before (1999–2007) and after (2008–2013) the 2008 threshold reform. The
first and second solid vertical lines in the figure denote the lower and upper limits of the excluded region
when estimating the counterfactual distribution. The counterfactual is estimated using a seventh-order
polynomial. The dotted vertical line denotes the upper limit of the region of dominated choice just above
the threshold. The estimate for excess bunching at the notch before 2008 is 2.55(0.228) and 1.71(0.882)
after the reform.
Figure B2: Bunching at the study subsidy notch: Before and after the 2008 reform
Earnings elasticity estimates.
We approximate the earnings elasticity at the study subsidy notch using a similar approach
as Kleven and Waseem (2013). We derive an upper-bound reduced-form earnings elasticity by
relating the earnings response of a marginal buncher student at zH to the implicit change in
tax liability between the notch point z∗ and zH (see Figure 2 in the main text). The marginal
buncher represents the individual with the highest income to move to the notch point, compared
to a counterfactual state in the absence of the notch. Intuitively, this approach treats the notch
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as a hypothetical kink which creates a jump in the implied marginal tax rate. More formally,
the reduced-form earnings elasticity is calculated with a quadratic formula
e(z∗) ≈ (zH/z∗)2/(4t/(1− t)) (13)
where (1 − t) is the net-of-tax rate at the notch, and 4t defines the change in the implied
marginal tax rate for the marginal buncher (Kleven and Waseem 2013).
The implied earnings elasticities are 0.083 (0.019 ) for all students and 0.065 (0.007 ) for
students with 9 subsidy months. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the bunching method does
not capture all earnings responses when the earnings choices are discrete, and therefore these
estimates do not represent the true earnings elasticity of students.
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